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he research problem examined in my thesis is stated

clearly in the title:
Rights.

Justice Brennan and The Bill of

In my examination, I rslied primarily on Brennan's

opinions, and secondarily, on scholarly commentaries authored by Brennan and others.
a combination of sources.

I located the cases through

Initially, I consulted the

rrerm ( s)," which is published annually in its November edition, and then, I turned to the writings by, and aoout,
Brennan.

~y

findings show that Brennan's approach in these

cases has evolved over the years toward a more absolutist
one.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the midst of the

1956 Presidential campaign telephoned Herbert Brownell, his
Attorney General, and said, "J:ind me a Catholic real quick,
t-1inton has retired." 1

Shortly thereat ter, William J.

Brennan, Jr., a distinguished Associate Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme court, was informed that he was President
Eisenhower's choice to fill the seat on the United states
Supreme Court vacated by the retirement of Associate Justice Sherman Minton. 2

His Congressional confirmation fol-

lowed immediately, and he took his oath of office on October 16, 1956.

He was then at the age of fifty the youngest

member of the court, and the first catholic appointment
since the death of Frank

~1urphy

in

1~4~.

william o. Douglas, ~_butobiography of~il:,!i.am_Q~
DQuglas; The court ~~' 1939-1~75 (New York:
Random
House, 1980), p. 249. Given the impending election and the
rising political star of John l'.. Kennedy, President Eisen1

hower was committed to getting "a young, lioeral, Catholic
Democrat" for political reasons.
2

According to E'rancis P. McQuade and Alexander T.
Kardos in "Mr. Justice Brennan and His Legal Philosophy,"
Notre Dame Lawy~, 33 (May, 1~58), p. 324, Brennan attributed his appointment in part to the probaole factors of
"his interest in court reform and his advocacy of more enlightened trial procedures to avoid court congestion."

2

During his twenty-six years on the Court, Brennan has
established himself as a judicial activist.

He has es-

poused an expansive view of the court's role in interpreting the constitution.

The guiding light of his activism

has been liberalism.3

Indeed, he was "the cutting edge of

Warren Court liberalism. 11 4

In 1':;}80, Erank I. tvlichelman

wrote in tribute:
No Justice in history, save Thurgood Marshall
has stood as bravely and eloquently as has william
Brennan for a thoroughly democratic vision of
social justice and political liberty, in which
status and opportunity are positively not allowed
to depend upon accident of oirth, background or
economic fortune, nor upon conformity in matters
of conscience, politics or association.~
while on the Court, Brennan's liberalism has evolved.
During his formative years, his liberalism was best described as pragmatic, but over the years, particularly
since 1969, it has become increasingly more idealistic. 6
3Webster's New collegiate piction,a~ {1975 ed.) defines liberalism as "a political philosophy based on oelief
in progress, the essential goodness of man, and the autonomy of the individual and standing for the protection of
political and civil liberties."
4Edward v. Heck, "Justice Brennan and the Heyday of
Warren court Liberalism," Santa Clara i,.aw Review, 20 {Fall,
1980) , p. 841.
5:r·rank I. Michelman, "A Trioute to Justice william
Brennan," Haryal:_O civil Righta-civil Liberties Law__Beview,
15 (Fall, 1~80), p. 296.
6

~~~A. defines pragmatic as "relating to matters
ot fact or practical affairs often to the exclusion of intellectual or artistic matters: practical as opposed to
idealistic." Conversely, it defines idealistic as "of or
relating to the practice of forming ideals or living under
their influence."

3

This evolution, however, is not complete.

That is, while

Brennan has moved toward an idealistic vision of liberalism, he has not completely abandoned a pragmatic one.
His Bill of Rights opinions-7 reflect his liberalism.
In this area, he has revealed himself clearly as a civil
libertarian by his preference for protecting the individual's liberties.

~otivated

by either his desire tor demo-

cratic self-government, or his respect for personal privacy
and human dignity, he has been a court leader in the efforts to place an umbrella over the liberties of the individual vis-a-vis government intrusions.

In this quest, he

oelieves that the court must take an active role.

He de-

clared that the special role assigned to the Supreme court
~ith

respect to the Bill of Rights is to interpret it in

such a way as to carry out the Eramers' determination to
prevent governmental oppression of individual liberties.

8

He draws upon history and legal precedent 9 as his primary

7This

is a paper about civil liberties, not civil
rights. There is a difference between the two. civil
rights are those rights of a citizen conferred by congress
such as the civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1~65, and 1~68.
Conversely, civil liberties are those liberties expressed
in the Bill of Rights that guarantee the individual freedom trom arbitrary governmental interference.
In other
words, civil liberties are a negation of governmental
power.

8

william J. Brennan, "Constitutional Adjudication,"
Notre Dame Law~, 40 (August, 1~65), p. 559.
'ae is not absolutely bound by precedent: nonetheless, he tended to respect it more than his libertarian,
warren Court Brethen.

4

tools in his attempt to carry out this special assigned
role.
The evolution in Brennan's liberalism is evidenced in
his evolving perception of civil liberty claims.

Early on,

he saw a great deal of "gray" in such claims, and used a
balancing test to resolve them.

His balance gave more em-

phasis to the individual's lioerty vis-a-vis the proposed
governmental policy reasons :tor aoridging it.

on the other

hand, he employed an absolutist approach in cases in which
the claim was presented in "black" and "white" terms.

over

the years, as his lioeralisrn has .oecome more idealistic, he
expanded this black and white area, and consequently, he
has relied increasingly more uf>On an absolutist approach.
In short, my thesis is that Brennan has moved increasingly
toward an absolutist approach in the area of the Bill of
Rights, but as of yet, not to the total disregard ot balancing.
~hat

factors lie behind this evolution(

able ones come to mind immediately.

Three prob-

One, the change of

guard between 1969 and 1975, from the libertarian warren
court to the law-and-order Burger Court.

compared to

warren court libertarians like Hugo L. Black, William

o.

Douglas, Arthur J. Goldberg, and Abe Eortas, Brennan seemed
moderate.

Conversely, in relation to Burger Court law-

and-order stalwarts such as Chief Justice

~arren

E. Burger,

and Justices Lewis F'. Powell, William H. Rehnquist, Harry

5
clackmun, and John

~aul

Stevens, Brennan appears radical.

In fact, many of his most vigorous and passionate libertarian opinions in the past decade have been direct reactions to the Burger court majority's law-and-order stance.
Two, the breakdown of ethical consensus in contemporary
America1-0 has had a marked influence upon Brennan's growing
tolerance of diversity in the areas of speech, .belief, and
lifestyle.

r'inally, the increasing absolutism, partly

stimulated by this breakdown, in the scholarly studies
Brennan has relied on.

The effect of these studies is most

obvious in his E'irst Amendment decisions.
Edward

v.

Heck illuminates a fourth factor.

He as-

serts that Brennan's evolution "may .be • • • more the result
of experience than a fundamental shift in his approach in
constitutional adjudication." 11

According to him, Brennan's

experience over the years has led to the diminishing of his
confidence in the other governmental branches, as well as
the lower courts, to give meaning to the supreme court decisions.

Consequently, his approach has become more aoso-

lute in order to restrict the discretionary oounds in which
trial judges, juries, and state legislatures can work out
the fundamental principles announced by the

10see G. Edward White,

f.at~.1,_Qf

su~reme

court.

Alllerican Legal

~~ht (New York & Oxford:
Oxford University Press,
1~78), pp. 167-172: and .1'.Q~ Law in f.merica.i,._-Ul Intellectual Histor~ (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1~80),

pp. 209-215.

1 1Heck, p. 876.

CHAPTE.R II
HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Justice Brennan's judicial product has not been formulated in a vacuum, but rather within the particular historical context encompassing his years on the court studied
here, 1~56-1982.
cline in

1

P~erica's

The late 1950's witnessed the rapid deexcessive cold War fear of internal corn-

munism and political radicalism.

~hile

this fear receded

into the background, liberalism moved to the forefront.
Between 1960 and 1968, America experienced an unparalleled
growth, in its history, of egalitarianism. 2

This growth,

1 My outline is a synthesis of my readings on this
period. These readings include: Charles c. Alexander,
HQ.!.ging the Li~ Th~i§enhower Era, ~52-19~ (Bloomington & London:
Indiana University Press, 1975); Carl M.
Brauer, John F. Kennedy gnd the second Reconst~~ (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1977); John Lewis Gaddis,
.l'.!!.ii...J.l.ni:ted states and the origins of the cold war, 1941.::
~ (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1972); Jim F'.
Heath, The Decade of Disi.1.l.Y.l.i.Qnme.nt: The Kennedy/Johwl2D
~.._., (Bloomington & London:
Indiana University Press,
1975); J. Joseph Huthmacher, ed., The Truman YearsJ...___Ib&
Reconstruction of Postwar AJPeri~ (Hinsdale, Illinois:
The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972); William Safire, ~gx§~
Fall: An .. IWlide View ot....the-f.a~a:tergate_wfil,te Hous.(Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975); Milton
Viorst, ;Eire in thJL.Streets: ameri~a in the 1960'1 (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1979); and Theodore H. white,
Breach 2.f-l:aith: ~-EQll of Richard Nixon (New York:
Atheneum Publishers, 1975).
2

.rt§~~.Ji defines egalitarianism as "a belief in human equality esp. with respect to social, political, and
economic rights and privileges."

7

however, waned in the late 1960's as frustration and disillusionment set in, and since 1968, America has reacted
by shifting toward conservatism.

3

The purpose of this

chapter is to outline the historical context in which
Brennan has served on the supreme Court.
The cold war, pitting the United states and its Democratic way of life against the soviet Union and its cornrnunistic one, began even before the Second world war ended.
One of its many initial consequences was the excessive
fear of internal communism and political radicalism that
swept America in the decade after 1945.

This fear, in

turn, generated an anti-communist crusade that was "compounded of a moderate element of intelligent concern for
public security • • • and a very large component of emotionalism, irrationalism, and downright hysteria. 114

Alfred A.

Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison outline the crusade's fundamental premise:
It held that the American communist Party, in
cooperation with the Soviet Union, was engaged
in a gigantic conspiracy to envelop the United
states in a network of espionage, to penetrate
3

webst~.a defines conservatism as "a political philosophy based on tradition and social stability, stressing
established institutions, and preferring gradual development to abrupt change: a disposition in politics to preserve what is established."
4

Alfred A. Kelly and Winfred A· Harbison, the AID~=
can constitu;tiQD.l Its_Qxigins and ~eve~~~ 5th Edition (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976),
p. 826.

8

the government and pervert and paralyze P.merican
politics, and finally to destroy the American
constitutional system in violent revolution.S
The crusade led to the adoption of an assortment of security and loyalty measures by the federal government and the
states aimed at guarding against the dangers of an internal communist conspiracy.
The "Red scare" reached its apex in the early 1950's
with the NcCarthy era.

In

~·ebruary

1950, Joseph Mccarthy,

an undistinguished junior Senator from Wisconsin, declared
that he had a list of 256-known Communists in the state
Department.

Between 1951 and 1954, he conducted invest!-

gations and hearings, under the auspices of the senate, to
ferret out these Communists.

It came to an abrapt end,

however, after McCarthy's disastrous encounter with the
brillant attorney Joseph welch in the 1954 senate hearings
on communism in the Army.
thyism for what it was:
fabrication.

In short, welch revealed McCara circus built on a foundation of

overall, this unveiling did much to discredit

America's excessive concern over Communist-controlled infiltration, subversion, and revolution.
In the late 1950's, as many /l.mericans came to see
its irrationality, the anti-communist crusade burned itself
out.

While it was burning out, a powerful new egalitarian

drive, the product of a myriad of forces, began to domi-

9

nate the American way of life.

The election of John F.

Kennedy to the Presidency in 1960 marked its official beginning, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Robert E. Kennedy in 1968 signalled its end.

During

these years, America's desire for egalitarianism was illustrated in congress' enactment of four monumental pieces
of legislation--the Civil Rights Act of 1964: the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964: the Voting Rights Act of 1965:
and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.

The Warren court, mean-

while, continued to play the leading role it had assumed
in 1954 in J;U;2wn

v.~.Q.a.l"d

of Education_of

To~,

in real-

izing this desire.
During the 1960's, tens of thousands of Americans,
many motivated by a desire for egalitarianism, took to the
streets in protest.

In the early part of the decade, their

methods of protest, as mirrored in the freedom rides, the
sit-ins, and the r.1artin Luther King led freedom marches,
were ones of passive resistance or non-violent civil disobedience.

But after 1965, the Johnson Administration es-

calated the United states' military involvement in Vietnam.

Many J\mericans became frustrated and disillusioned, for
they saw this escalation as an abandonment of liberalism.
Their outrage was reflected in the protest movement's increasing use of violence.

Indeed, the phrase "Fire in the

Streets" aptly describes the historical period between 1965
and 1971.

As they witnessed the Administration's offering

10
of their crusade for equality as a sacrificial lamb, many
Black civil rights activists grew impatient with King's
tactic of non-violent resistance, and accepted the violent
means advocated by the "Black Power" movement.

The "white"

protest movement, concentrated exclusively by then against

u.s.

military involvement in southeast Asia, likewise, be-

came increasingly militant, as exhibited outside Chicago's
1968 Democratic National Convention.

The protest movement

and much of what it represented was defused by the rise of
conservatism in the 1970's.
As frustration and disillusionment with liberalism
hardened during the late 1960's, a sentiment of conservatism began to sweep the land.

Indeed, since 1969, this

sentiment has engulfed the American way of life.

It was

a major factor in the elections of Richard M. Nixon in
1968 and 1972, and Ronald Reagan in 1980.

Moreover, it

is illustrated in the Warren Court's law-and-order interpretation of the Bill of Rights.
conservatism was so strong that it was able to withstand the shock of Nixon's "Imperial Presidency."
his years in the

~bite

During

House, Nixon, under the guise of

the executive prerogative power, did much to undermine the
credibility and respectability of the Executive Office.
In June 1971, The New York Til!l§.§ and the Jtgshington fost
published the Daniel Ellsberg purloined Defense Department 1 s "inside" account of U.S. military activities in

11

southeast Asia.

Prior to the publication of the so-called

"Pentagon Papers," a special White House espionage unit
dubbed the ".Plumbers," in the name ot national security,
illegally tried to recover them; for Nixon regarded the
"Papers" as a source of embarrassment to his administra~hen

tion.

these efforts failed, Nixon appealed to the

courts in an unsuccessful attempt to suppress their publication.

While his actions in this instance were question-

able, they arguably were impeachable in connection with the
'Watergate crisis.

In June 1972, agents of the

Wh~te

House,

acting on direct orders, staged a break-in of the Democratic National committee's Washington, o.c. headquarters located at the Watergate apartment complex.

After it came to

the public's attention in E'ebruary 1973, Nixon publicly
prevaricated about his administration's involvement in the
break-in and the subsequent coverup conspiracy.

Later, he

formally refused to comply with a court addressed subpoena
ordering him to produce a series of tape recordings of his
private conversations with the White House staff, covering
the period from June 20 I 1972 to April 15 I 1973.

r·inally I

he resigned as President on August 9, 1974, to avoid impeachment by the congress for his complicity in the Watergate coverup.
Justice Brennan's position with respect to the Bill
of Rights has evolved within this historical context.

An

understanding of that context is critical, for his position

12
is partially a product thereof, at least, to the extent
that the cases were shaped within that context and brought
before the supreme Court for resolution.

Moreover, Brennan

revealed a consciousness of the context in a number of
cases.

A prime example of this is his dissenting opinion

in Walker v._.city of Birmingham (1967).

Therein, he wrote,

"we cannot permit fears of 'riots' and 'civil disooedience'
generated by slogans like 'Black Power' to divert our attention ot 'What is here at stake. 116

In the next eight

chapters, I intend to shed light on this evolution through
an examination of Brennan's Bill of Rights opinions.
6 walker v. city of Birmingham, 87 s.ct. 1824 (1~67),
p. 1647.

CHAPTl:.R III
rIRST AMBNDMENT/
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The further breakdown of ethical consensus in contemporary p.merica 1 is an underlying factor in the evolution of
Brennan's judicial product.

This breakdown has led in-

creasingly toward a type of ethical relativism:

what con-

stitutes "ethical" or "propriety" depends upon the respective individual's view of it.

over the years, Brennan's

decisions, partly fueled by this breakdown, have exhibited
a growing toleration, indeed appreciation, for diversity in
speech, belief, and lifestyle.

In this chapter and subse-

quent ones, I intend to discuss its possible implications
upon his r'irst Amendment opinions.
The Eounding Fathers wrote the guarantee of religious
f reedorn into the F'irst Mnendment' s Establishment and

hxercise Clause.

r ree

Brennan views freedom of religion as one

ot the most precious values in American society.

He con-

tends that governmental involvement in the establishment
of religion, and/or its curtailment of the free exercise
thereof, must be strictly guarded against.
1

He points out,

There is some scholarly debate over when the breakdown actually began, but one thing is certain, it continued during the 1960's and 1970's.

14
however, that not every interaction between religion and
government is per se unconstitutional. As one who toler2
ates religion as broadly as possible, Brennan argues that
the free exercise principle should be dominant whenever the
two clauses,are in tension.

He wrote, "the two clauses,

although distinct in their objectives and their applicability, emerged from a common panorama of history 113 :

the

Founding Fathers determination to make government and religion independent of each other.

There are at least three

distinct schools of thought that influenced the Founding

~athers in drawing a separating line 4 between the government and religion:
the Madisonian.

the evangelical; the Jeffersonian; and

Laurence H. Tribe describes these three

schools in the following passage:
first, the evangelical view (associated primarily with Roger Williams) that 'worldly corruptions
• • .might consume the churches if sturdy fences
against the wilderness were not maintained'; second, the Jeffersonian view that the church should
be walled off from the state in order to safeguard
secular interests (public and private) 'against
ecclesiastical depredations and incursions': and,
2

To some degree, Brennan's Catholicism possibly figures with regard to his toleration of religion.
3

83

schoo~strict ot.....Abbington 'rownsmJ2....Y..1. ~chefill29,

s.ct.
4

1560 (1963), p. 1577.

Brennan does not subscribe to the doctrinaire "wall"
metaphor as a description of the separation characterizing
religion-government relations. Rather, he views the se~a
ration in terms of an "elusive" line that requires clarification.

15
third, the Madisonian view that religion and secular interests alike would be advanced best by
diffusing and decentralizing power so as to assure
the competition among sects rather than dominance
by any one.5
Brennan subscribes to the latter.

He holds that the real-

ization of ooth government's and religion's high purposes
is contingent on keeping the

t~o

separate.

over the years,

consonant with his shift toward absolutism, his determination to keep them apart has increased.
The breakdown of ethical consensus underlies his
freedom of religion opinions.

According to G.

~dward

white, "religious dogma was a major source of (America's)
shared communal values (prior to 1850). 116

This source,

however, has diminished since then with the rise of industrialization and urbanization.

Consequently, theological

explanations were supplanted in the second half of the
nineteenth century by scientific and secular ones, and,
also, in the twentieth century by social science ones.
1960's and

1~70's

The

phase of this breakdown, moreover, ":tos-

tered a strong interest in identifying one's own personal
5

.
.
t.ional Law
Laurence H. Tri'be, Am§~can
Co~tu
(Mineola, New York: The ~-oundation Press, Inc., 1~78),
pp. 816-817. i<.lso, see t-lark De Wolfe Howe, :!be Goxernment
.an.d...~ Wi~rness; ~gion .an~overnment in Affierican
Hi.§~ (Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago
Press, 1965), for a more detailed account of the influence
of the evangelical and Jeffersonian views.
6
white, ~!U:Il§ of A!DJU:~1LLegal Thought, p. 167.

16
convictions (and values),"

7

which in turn, has led to a

greater diversification of religious practices in America.
Tribe asserts, "religion in America, always pluralistic,
has become radically so in the latter gart of the twentieth
century. 118
The issue of religious services in the public schools
was, and still is, controversial in the United states.
the cases ot Engel v. VitQ!.e (1962) and
~ngton Township_Y..t.~~

~bool_Qistrict

In
of

{1963), the supreme court

declared that the recitation of the New York state Board
of Regent's recommended twenty-two word "non-sectarian"
prayer in the public schools, and Pennsylvania's law requiring that at least ten verses from the Holy Bi.ble be
read daily without comment in its public schools, violated
the Establishment Clause.

lirennan joined in the majority

opinion in Engel, but wrote a concurring opinion in Schempp
because of his "great uneasiness that the court's injunction of strict neutrality between religion and non-religion
might have too wide a sweep in banning 'every vestige of
cooperation between religion and government, however
slight.

1

"

9

In his 74-page concurring opinion, he argued

7 wh'ite, :i:ort i..sw in e.m~ric9, p. 213.
8
.
Tribe, p. 826.
9
Kelly and Har.bison, p. 976.

17
that the Founding Fathers intended in the Establishment
Clause "to end the extension ot civil government's support
of religion in a manner which made the two in some degree

.
10
interdependent."

. t en t 'ion, 11
In a quest to h onor t h'is in

he adopted and applied Justice Robert H. Jackson's test for
determining whether a particular exercise violated the
Clause.

He summarized the test as follows:

the Clause enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the
essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government
for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
ends where secular means would suffice.12
He concluded that Pennsylvania's law clearly represented
a form of involvement that violated the Establishment
Clause, for it employed the public schools, an organ of
government, for essentially religious purposes (i.e., the
inculcation of Christian values).
~DW!Jlm

10

is illuminating because i t implicates the

Schempp, p. 1577.

11

.
.
.
d oes
Accor d.ing t o M. Howe • s interpretation,
Brennan
not rely heavily upon the :Founding Fathers' original understanding with respect to the religion clauses.
Howe argued in ~ Gard.mi__,and The Wilderness that their original
understanding was best expressed in the evangelical view,
and that the Supreme Court had distorted it by relying almost exclusively upon the Jeffersonian view.
while his
argument is appealing, it is incomplete. Granted, some of
the ~~unding Fathers were influenced by the evangelical
view, but others undoubtedly were influenced by the Jeffersonian view.
In short, both are correct, and aptly expressed in the Madisonian view as adopted by Brennan.
12

~hempp,

p. 1576.

18
oreakdown of ethical consensus.

Underlying Brennan's opin-

ion is his objection to the state involving itself in the
inculcation of Christian values, particularly, considering
the fact that many of the students and their parents were
not of the Christian faith.

Furthermore, many of those who

were Christian did not completely agree with the particular
values and doctrines enunciated.

In short, Brennan thinks

that the individual is afforded freedom of conscience
{i.e., the right to believe as he wishes) by the Eirst
Amendment, and that the government is .banned from tampering
with this freedom in most contexts, including the area of
religious belief or non-belief.
~sbyteriAn.-~l.lr~i.n_.t.be

Uniteg

s~~

v.

Mar~

l:iliz_gbe;klL.Jil:!.l..e Hull...b~liLl!!"esb~te~IL~hu~.b ( 1~69) ,

presented the supreme Court with the question whether the
courts could resolve a church property dispute which turned
on doctrinal differences.

In

1~66,

two local Presby-

terian Churches in Savannah, Georgia, voted to withdraw
trom the general church on doctrinal grounds.

After a com-

mission of the general church took over the administration
of the local churches, the latter bypassed appeals to higher church authorities and sued in state court to enjoin the
mother church from interfering with their exclusive use and
control of the local church properties.

The general church

cross-claimed for similar injunctive relief.

The Georgia

Supreme Court granted the Blue Hull Church custody of the

19
property on the ground that the United States Presbyterian
13
Church had departed from established church doctrine.
Brennan, speaking for the majority, reversed based on the

principle that civil courts must defer resolution of all
ecclesiastical questions to a religion's internal decisionmaking organs.

He declared that "it is of course true that

the state has a legitimate interest in resolving property
disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that
resolution. 1114

He stated, however, that the Establishment

Clause "severely circumscribes the role that civil courts
may play in resolving church property disputes." 15

He

contended that it prevented the courts, as an agency of the
government, from playing a role in resolving church property disputes that turned on resolution of ecclesiastical
questions.

He concluded that this case requited the courts

to resolve such questions, and as a result, the Georgia
supreme court holding could not stand under the Bstablish13These departures from established church doctrine
included such actions as the ordination of women ministers,
the making of pronouncements on civil matters, the support
ot steps to end Bible reading in the schools, and the
teaching of nee-orthodoxy alien to the contession of Eaith
and Cathechism as originally adopted by the general church.
~hese departures, moreover, reflect the Presbyterian Church
of u.s.A.'s attempts to articulate some new religious consensus as a means of curbing its further breakdown.
Presbyteri.an Chui-ch in the Yfilte~~il v. Ma-'=~
Ull~h....~ Hull ~morial._fX§~.t.§rian .c.mt.n;,b, 89
s.ct. 601 (1969), p. 605.
15 Ibi.Q...., p. 606.
14

20

ment clause.

Indeed, he held that any application of a

departure-from-doctrine test by a civil court resolving a
dispute over property was forbidden by the religion
clauses.

He commanded both parties to restructure their

dispute so as to require the civil courts to resolve only
non-ecclesiastical questions.
In 1969, Chief Justice Earl

~arren

retired, thus sig-

nalling the end of the warren court era, and in his stead,
President Nixon appointed Warren E. Burger.

On the whole,

the Burger court has continued the warren Court's strict
separationist stand on the interaction of religion and
government.

Chief Justice Burger, however, did not em-

brace this stand, but rather, unsuccessfully attempted to
win majority support for his compromise approach between
separationist and accommodationist positions. 16
proach initially revealed itself in
.Qt_;&b~

City oL.....Hew

Xo~&

(1970).

li.Q~

His ap-

v. Tax commission

Speaking for the court,

he held that New York's statute exempting churches from
real property taxes did not violate the Establishment
Clause.

The fact that such exemptions dated back to colo-

nial times and existed, with various modifications, in
every state and the District of Columbia weighed heavily
in his decision, as well as in Brennan's concurrence.

In

his opinion, Brennan conducted an examination of the his16

Kelly and Harbison, p. 995.
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tory, purpose, and operation of real property tax exemptions for religious organizations in order to determine
whether such exemptions breached the Establishment Clause.
Against the background of this examination, he concluded
that they did not breach the Clause, for they did not (a)
serve the essentially religious

activit~es

of religious in-

stitutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means
would suffice.

He supported this decision by stating that

"the principle effect of the tax exemptions was to carry
out secular purposes--the encouragement of public service
activities and of a pluralistic society. 1117

He further

stated that "the means employed by churches to carry on
their public services • • • are the same means used by any
other purely secular organization---money, human time and
skills, physical facilities. 1118

Finally, he wrote, "all

churches by their existence contribute to the diversity of
association, viewpoint, and enterprise so highly valued
by all of us. 1119
17

s.ct.

he.l~__11ax Co~§§ion

of ,tbe city of New York, 90

1409 (1970), p. 1424.

18

.

l.Q~,

19,

p. 1424.

Ibid., p. 1424. Citation of this contribution is
in line with Brennan's broader adherence to the political
toundation of the rirst Amendment.
In short, he believes
that tax exemptions for churches furthers the "self-governing powers" of the American people.

22
'l'he issue of federal and state appropriations for
private sectarian schools has come, in various forms, before the Burger court.

This issue increasingly drew the

public's attention, and indeed after 1967, it became the
dominant "establishment" question.

Brennan consistently

has held that such aid violates the Establishment Clause,
for it, at the very least, indirectly benefits the schools'
sectarian purposes.

In Lemon v. Kurtzman {1971}, the ques-

tion was raised whether three state statutes providing tor
direct subsidies from public funds for secular activities
carried on by sectarian educational institutions violated
the Establishment Clause.

The court held that they vio-

lated the Clause, for they involved "excessive entanglement" between church and state. 20

In a concurring opin-

ion, Brennan examined the purpose and operation of the
particular statutes in order to ascertain whether they
breached the Establishment Clause.

Against this back-

ground, he concluded that they, unlike property tax exemptions in

~~.

violated the Clause because they failed to

pass muster under the three-factor test--secular purpose,
primary secular effect, and absence of excessive entangle20

The risk posed by the statutes for political division along religious lines figured in the court's judgement. 'l'he "excessive entanglement" standard derived from
the third prong of the Jacksonian test, and it reflected
the strong separationist stance associated primarily with
Justices Black and Douglas.

23
. dby h'im. 21
ment--appl ie

He asserted that the statutes im-

permissibly involved the States and the

~·ederal

Government

with essentially religious activities of sectarian educational institutions, and that each government used essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where
secular means would suffice.

He proclaimed that when aid

flows directly to the sectarian institution the function of
religious instruction benefits.

He wrote, "the statutes

require 'too close a proximity' of government to the subsidized sectarian institutions and in my view create real
22
dangers of 'the secularization of a creed. 1 "
Prior to 1975, Brennan had always applied the threefactor test in Establishment Clause cases; however, in Meek
v. Pittenger (1975), he expressly added a fourth--the political divisiveness factor.

He added this factor because

the conflict over the issue of public appropriations for
private sectarian schools threatened to divide the elec21 Public education is a key to understanding ~hy he
distinguishes the two cases.
In .b,2~, he justified his
decision by claiming that church property tax exemptions
encourage churches to carry out public service activities.
In ~rnon, however, he infers that public education is not
one of those activities. In short, it is the function ot·
the state, not religious institutions. Another key is
history. Brennan argued in ~ that history overwhelmingly showed that property tax exemptions for churches were
an accepted form of interaction between government and religion. Conversely, in Lemon, he claims that history reveals that public subsidy of sectarian schools is not an
acceptable form of interaction.
2 2Ta&mon
..c

1l'

v~yr

t zmap, 91
.

s.ct.

2105 (1971), p. 2129.
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torate along religious lines.

Organized religion, in par-

ticular, heavy catholic populations in the Northeastern
states, were seeking economic resources for their private
schools through the political arena.

According to Brennan,

the factor had been added without express recognition by
23
.
the cour t in Lemon.

The factor guarded against excessive

political entanglement of government and religion along
religious lines.

Brennan declared that "political division

along religious lines was one of the principle evils
against which the
tect.1124

~irst

.Amendment was intended to pro-

Relying upon the tactor, he concluded that all

the provisions in Pennsylvania's law providing tor state
expenditures in connection with the education of students
23 1n Lemgn, Burger predicted that "continuing financial pressure on nonpublic schools would, because of the
annual nature of appropriations, generate considerable and
recurring political activity to maintain, if not increase
state aid. Since the vast majority of nonpublic schools
are church affiliated, loboying would inevitably be mounted
along religious lines ... He declared that "this probability
that religious partisanship would intrude into the l:)Olitical arena could not be tolerated." According to Tribe,
hffierican Constitutional Law (1978), p. 867, the Court's reliance upon the political-divisiveness test in Lemon, Com=.
m.U~~g_x_fyQl_i~~ucation L.~~.t ( 1~7 3) , and tieek is
"best understood as limiting the political role ot organized religion when it seeks institutional power or economic resources tor itself, but not when it seeks to persuade
others of its views on public issues."
24
Meek v. Pittenger, 95 s.ct. 1753 (1975), p. 1769.
It can not be reiterated enough that Brennan subscribes to
the political foundation view of the Idrst Amendment.
In
this particular case, he believes that the possibility of
political division along religious lines can not be tolerated, for it is a threat to the normal political process
and the realization of the "self-governing powers."

25
in nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause.
In 1971, the

~aryland

legislature enacted a statute

that authorized the payment of noncategorical grants to
private colleges awarding more than just seminarian or
theological degrees: 5 of the 17 institutions receiving
funds under the program in 1971 were religiously aff iliated.

In response to LemQn and other supreme court deci-

sions prohibiting certain types of aid to parochial schools
the legislature amended the statute in
of money for "sectarian purposes."
Public works of

Ma~ylan~

1~72

to ban the use

In Roeme.L..L_lioard of

(1976), the supreme court upheld

the constitutionality ot the grants despite the aided colleges' formal affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church on
the ground that they did not have the "primary effect" of
advancing religion.

In a dissenting opinion, Brennan stuck

to his strict view of the Establishment Clause with respect
to appropriations to religiously affiliated schools.
strict view, or as Tribe defines

it~••the

The

remote-indirect-

and-incidental standard"-compels a more searching inquiry
than the "primary effect" test, and comes closer to the absolutist no-aid approach to the Establishment Clause.
calling his concurrence in

~.QD,

Re-

he declared that it is

"pure fantasy" to assert that the religious mission of the
schools does not benefit in some direct or indirect way by
aid to "secular" aspects of a church-related school.

He

argued that the law "exposes state money for use in advanc-

26
.
. .
..2s
ing re 1 igion.

He declared that .. the discrete interests

of government and religion are mutually best served when
each avoids too close proximity to the other. 1126

He be-

lieves that it is not only the nonbeliever who benefits
from keeping the two separate, but also the devout be27
.
l iever.

He wrote:

It is not only the nonbeliever who tears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies
into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is
the devout believer who fears the secularization
of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with
and dependent upon government.28
He concluded that the Statute breached the Establishment
Clause because it required

11

too close a proximity" between

government and religion.
In the companion cases of
~Guys

25

~owen

I:'rom Harrison-A1lentown .x.

v. Maryland

McGin~

(1~61),

(1~61),
~un-

B.Qemer y.....__liQard of Public Works of ~lanQ, 96
2337 (1976), ~· 2356.
26
Ibid,, p. 2357. This statement echoes, as Tribe
describes, "a Madisonian concern that secular and religious
authorities not interfere excessively with one another's
respective spheres of choice and influence, lest both government and religion be corrupted, the political system
strained 'to the breaking point,• and liberty of conscience
ultimately compromised. 11
27
This belief is a perfect reflection of Brennan's
liberalism in the area of religious treedom.
In The Gar~
.and ·rhe~.ilderne§s, Howe claimed that placing the believer
and non-believer on an equal plane vis-a-vis the religious
clauses, as Brennan does, mirrors the Warren court's tendency to make equality the central objective of constitutional government. He argued, however, that this placement
is an imprecise reading of the clauses' historical intent.
28
~ll· p. 2357.

s.ct.

27
~ld

v. Brsuai (1961), and

!!!.9~

~lagher

y. Crolm Kosher super-

(1961), the supreme Court addressed the constitu-

tionality of Sunday Closing Laws.

The Court held that the

laws in question did not violate the

~'irst

Amendment's

guarantee of religious freedom and anti-establishment.
Chief Justice warren concluded that they regulated secular
activities, not religious ones.

Brennan joined in his de-

cision in the first two cases, but dissented from his decision in the latter two.
like in

~wen

and

In Braunfeld and

~Ginley,

Qgllaghe~,

un-

the emphasis shifted from

anti-establishment to free exercise claims.
Brennan's dissent in ia-.sw.n.teld covered both cases.
The petitioner, a retailer who belonged to the Orthodox
Jewish faith challenged the Pennsylvania laws, alleging
that the enforced closing of his store on Sunday, combined
with his voluntary closing on Saturday for religious reasons, would render him unable to continue his business.
Brennan agreed with the majority's opinion that Pennsylvania's law did not violate the Establishment Clause, but
he dissented from its view that it did not abridge the
petitioner's right to practice his Jewish faith.

He wrote,

"religious freedom--the freedom to believe and to practice
strange and, it may be foreign creeds 29--has classically
29 Th'is statement reflects the greater diversificat.ton

of religious practices that has characterized the latter
part of twentieth century America.

28

been one of the highest values of our society. 1130

He fur-

ther wrote, "the rights of conscience are, in their nature,
of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest
touch of the governmental hand. 1131

He claimed that the law

penalized Braunfeld by placing him at a substantial competitive disadvantage with his non-Jewish competitors, for
his religious faith compelled him to close his store on
Saturday and the law forced him to close on Sunday.

He

stated that the law, in effect, made Braunfeld choose between his business and his religion. 32

Moreover, he con-

tended that the law, like one declared unconstitutional in
an earlier case, imposed a virtual tax on Braunfeld's right
to exercise his religion.

He thus concluded that it clear-

ly breached the Eree Exercise Clause.
Brennan's approach in freedom of religion cases ref lects his determination to safeguard the high purposes of
government and religion by keeping the two separate and independent of each other.
30

~.aynfeld

y.

His approach is consistent with

~n.

81 s.ct. 1144 (1961), p. 11so.

31

.iQiQ..s., p. 1152.

32

1n the face of free exercise claims, Brennan would
declare all Sunday Closing Laws unconstitutional, for the
"mere convenience of having everyone rest on the same day"
is not a legitimate state interest to infringe religious
freedom. On the other hand, he would not do the same in
the face of anti-establishment claims as in ~~n and
~~ because the laws were, in spite of their religious origin, now primarily secular in character and purpose.
In short, while the laws clearly did not serve to
establish religion, they did inhibit the free exercise
thereof.

29

the Madisonian view ot the historical intent ot the religion clauses.

In his quest to honor this intent, he ini-

adopt~d

tially

and applied a three-factor test, and later,

he added a fourth in anti-establishment cases.

Against the

oackground of this test, his opinions mirror a propensity
to declare unconstitutional almost all acts that involve
interaction between government and religion.

tw1oreover,

they reflect the breakdown of ethical consensus in contemporary America, and a movement toward an absolutist noaid stance.

In the cases of Schempp and Presbyterian

church (U.s.a.A...l_, he proclaimed that government support of
prayer in the public schools, and judicial review ot ecclesiastical questions breached the hsta.blishment Clause.
ln Lemon,

t~+eek,

and t<.oemer, he declared that public sub-

sidy of sectarian educational institutions inf ringed tne
Clause.
On the other hand, he announced in

~

that church

property tax exemptions did not violate the hstablishment
clause.

At tirst glance, his decision seems to be an in-

consistency; however, atter scratching the surface, one
finds that it is not.

At the very least, Brennan views

such exemptions as the lesser of two evils because they
entail less entanglement than would taxation.

.Moreover,

he looked at the history of such tax exemptions and found
that they led to a greater free exercise of all forms of
religious faith, not to an established church.

In Braun-

30

telg, he claimed that the
late the
poses.

~stablishment

~unday

closing Laws did not vio-

Clause, for they served secular pur-

conversely, he held that they abridged the individ-

ual's right to practice his religious faith.
Brennan argued in Roemer that the religion clauses
protect both the non-believer and believer on equal terms.
33
In ~~~Q.....V. Watkina (1961),
the Supreme court, speaking through Justice Black, held that a law requiring a
declaration of belief in God as a condition of becoming a
notary public was unconstitutional, for it placed that
state "on the side of one particular sort of believers."
Brennan joined in Black's opinion.

In .both cases, the non-

believer and believer are placed on the same level in relation to the religion clauses.

In sum, this placement

illuminates Brennan's liberalism in the area ot religious
freedom and anti-establishment, for it reflects his proclivity to make equality the central objective of constitutional government.
33 Torcaso v. Watk'1:.DA• 81 s.ct. 1680 (1961).

CHAPTER IV

rIRST AMENDMENT/
FREE UPRESSION
'I'he Meiklejohnian interpretation of. the t irst Amendment's guarantee of free expression is the foundation of
Brennan's approach in this area.

He agrees with Dr.

Alexander f't1eiklejohn' s argument that in creating "a form
of government under which they granted only some powers
to the federal and state instruments they established,"
the American people exhibited a basic determination "to
govern themselves rather than be governed by others. 111
He concurs that the guarantee of free expression "is the
repository of these self-governing powers. 112

:t·inally, he

acknowledges that freedom of expression absolutely protects from abridgement all torms ot expression that fall
-within the category of subjects having "governing importance."
~tl,:i

r.chese subjects included all expression which disustained and furthered the self-governing powers

of the people.

over the years, Brennan has expanded the

category of "self-governing subjects" beyond that outlined
1

wi·11·1 am J. Brennan, "The Supreme court and the
Meiklejohnian Interpretation of the F'irst Amendment,"
HA~vard Law Review, 79 (November, 1965), p. 11.
2

Ibid., p. 12.
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by Meiklejohn 3 to include expression that may indirectly
contribute to the knowledge of the electorate.

This ex-

pansion, fueled partly by the increasing absolutism in the
scholarly studies 4 he has relied upon and the breakdown of
ethical consensus, mirrors Brennan's movement toward an
absolutist position.
The companion cases of

llg~nblatt

v..L....Ynij;ed

St..9£~

(1959) and Uphaus v. wyman (1959) involved the relationship
between the governmental investigatory function and the
~irst

~~endment.

The congressional investigatory power is

implicit in the Constitution's grant of "legislative powers 0 to Congress.

'l.1 he power, however,

is not unlimited.

It can be exercised only to the extent that it is pertinent
to the formulation of legislation.

During the

l~SO's,

con-

gress exercised this power in an effort to expose the communist conspiracy.

Barenblatt's conviction for contempt

of Congress for refusing to answer questions before a House
Un-American Activities subcommittee investigating communism
in education pertaining to his past and/or present membership in the Communist Party gave birth to the former case.
30

• • • free speech is protected by the first amendment as essential to intelligent self-government in a democratic system. As expounded by Alexander .Meiklejohn, its
most widely cited proponent, the theory would limit the
special guarantees of the first amendment to public issues
of civil importance." Tribe, p. 577.
4
These scholarly studies include the writings and
commentaries of Laurence H. Tribe, ~i.£gn_~~~utional
Law, and 'I'homas I. I:;merson, ·rbe sy~-2.t.._.1;··reedom of :E.x~ssig,n (New York:
Vintage Books, 1970).
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The supreme court sustained the conviction on the ground
that the government's right to selt-preservation in the
face of communist subversive activities was more important

than Barenblatt's First Amendment rights.

In a short dis-

senting opinion, Brennan declared that the purpose of the
congressional investigation was "exposure purely for the
sake of exposure," and that this was not a valid purpose to
which the government could subordinate Barenblatt's Eirst
Amendment rights. 5
The origin of the latter case was Uphaus' conviction
for contempt tor refusing to answer questions or to produce
certain documents for an anti-communist investigation into
higher education conducted by the state of New Hampshire's
attorney general under an authorizing resolution of the
state legislature.

AS

in

Barenbl.at~,

the supreme court

affirmed the public's hysteria over the threat of a comrnunist conspiracy by balancing away the individual's tirst
;Jnendment rights in favor of the government's need for
self-preservation.

In another dissenting opinion, Brennan

declared that the legislature's authorizing resolution

clearly invaded Uphaus' constitutional rights ot freedom
of speech and assembly.

He argued that the sole purpose of

the legislative investigation in question was "exposure
solely for the sake of exposure."
5

~enblatt

p. 1114.

l!..!.. .. United State.§ I

He wrote:

79

s. ct.

1081 ( 1959),
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The investigation, as revealed by the report,
was overwhelmingly and predominately a roving
self-contained investigation of individual and
group behavior, and behavior in a constitutionally protected area.
Its whole approach was to name
names, disclose information about those named, and
observe that 'facts are facts.•6
He further argued that the state of New Hampshire was unable to show any state interest sufficient to subordinate
Uphaus' constitutionally protected freedom of expression.
In short, "exposure" was not "a valid legislative interest
of the state."

consequently, he concluded, as in Baren-

blat£, that the conviction for contempt must be reversed.
The striking thing in both Barenblatt and Uphaus was
that Brennan, the liberal, used the balancing test.

The

test was adopted and applied by conservatives in the post~orld

war II era as a means of realizing their political

values of stability, order, and security. 7

conservatives

such as Justices l"elix E'rankf urter and John Marshall Harlan
balanced civil liberty claims against proposed governmental
policy reasons for abridging them.

Giving more weight to

governmental interests vis-a-vis those of the individual,
they of ten ruled in favor of the government.

Brennan bal-

anced the same factors, but, unlike the conservatives, he,
consistent with his libertarian concern for individual
freedom and the open society, shifted the overburdening
6

~haus

v.

w~,

79 s.ct. 1040 (1959), .p. 1056.

7
Kelly and Harbison, pp. 825-826.
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weight to the side of the individual.

over the years, re-

flecting his movement toward an absolutist position, he has
increasingly added weight to the individual's side of the

balance.

consequently, he almost always has decided in

favor of the individual.

Finally, his use of the test is

an example of his pragmatic liberalism, in that, his method, in this case, was conservative, but his end was liber al.
In July 1963, Dr. Corliss LaMont was notified by the
Post Office that, pursuant to section 305 of the Postal
service and .tederal Employees Salary Act of 1~62, 8 it was
detaining an unsolicited copy of the ,f§king
had been addressed to him.
Amendment grounds.
UniteQ_~~

Revi~

that

Lat¥1ont promptly sued on r irst

In LaMont y, Postm.G\ster General ot

(1965), a unanimous court held that section

305 was unconstitutional, for it placed a limitation on the
addressee's

~irst

Amendment rights.

In a concurring opin-

ion, Brennan stated that in the absence of an overriding
governmental interest, each person has an unconditional
right of access to publications.

He argued that "in the

area ot first Ainendment freedoms, government has the duty
to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which
8

'I he act authorized the Post Office to detain and de1

stroy mail that had been determined by the Postmaster General to be communist "political" p~opaganda, unless the mail
was requested by the addressee or unless it was otherwise
ascertained that delivery was sought.
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are adequate for the purpose. 119

.turthermore, he asserted

that "if the government wishes to withdraw a subsidy or
privilege, it must do so by means and on terms which do not
endanger First Amendment rights. 1110

.Einally, he drew an

analogy between this practice and the practices of "the
feared and hated" communistic regimes from "Whence the propaganda emanated.

He proclaimed:

That the governments which originate this propaganda themselves have no equivalent guarantees
only highlights the cherished values of our constitutional framework1 it can never justify emulating the practice of restrictive regimes in the
name of expediency.11
New York's loyalty program under the controverted
Feinberg Law which, among other things, made membership in
the communist Party prima facie evidence of disqualif ica-

.

~

LaNont y. Postmaster General of united statil§, 85 s.
ct. 14~8 (1~65), p. 1498. Brennan did not shut the door
on governmental regulation of· free expression in this area,
nor did he explicitly outline what would constitute "a
least intrusive regulation." One thing is certain though,
Brennan believes that such a regulation can not cast the
Postmaster General, indeed any Administrator, in the role
ot censor or "Big Brother," for he is not equipped to do
so.
10
1bi"1._, p. 1498. The right to access of publications is an implicit E'irst Amendment right. Brennan pointed out that 11 the scope of the Bill of Rights extends beyond

the enumerated guarantees to protect correlative interests
without which the rights expressed would not be fully safeguarded." He concluded that "the right to receive publications is such an interest because the Eirst Amendment's
protection of the 'dissemination of ideas can accomplish
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to
receive and consider them.'"
11

Ibi~, p. 1498.
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tion for appointment or retention in the public-school system came, for the last time, before the court in Keyishian

y, Board of Regents of the University Qi the state of New
York

(1~67).

The law was enacted in 1949, and sustained

by the Vinson court in the case of
.t.!gn (1952),

~dler

v. Board of Educa-

But by 1967, the anti-communist crusade had

long ago burned out.

Brennan, speaking for the court, pro-

claimed that the "classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace
of ideas. 11112

Indeed, he announced that "the Nation's

future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers the truth
'out of a multitude ot tongues, rather than through any
kind of authoritative selection, 11113

He asserted, there-

fore, that "the rirst Amendment does not tolerate laws that
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."

14

And that

since "r·irst Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity, 1115

Against this background, he concluded

that "New York's complicated and intrinsic scheme" clearly
violated freedom of expression, and as such was unconsti12

~_the

Keyi§.bi.an_~ The Board of Regent~t the Universi~
state of New York, 87 s.ct. 675 (1967), p. 683.

13
14
15

Ibid,, p. 683.

Ibig,, p. 683.

Ibid. , p. 684. F·or Brennan, "narrow specificity"
means that government must define in extremely narrow and
clear terms what it intends to regulate.
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tutional.
In 1971, the Nixon Administration demanded that the
supreme court enjoin two national newspapers,

~~lLXQl:k

ti™ and the .rtashington Post, from publishing "the contents of a classified study entitled 'History of United
states Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy.'"
New York

Tim~Company

y.

United~tates

In

(1971), the court

refused the demand on the ground that the Administration
had not met its burden of showing justification for imposition of prior restraint on publication of the "Pentagon
Papers."

The fact that all the Justices wrote opinions il-

lustrates both the importance of the issue, and the puolic's justifiable interest in the study.

Brennan wrote a

separate concurring opinion to emphasize that "the F'irst
Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial restraints
of the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result. 1116

He conceded, however,

that there existed a single, extremely narrow class ot
cases in which the F'irst Amendment• s ban on prior judicial
restraint may be overridden.

He declared that

our cases thus far indicated that such cases may
arise only when the Nation 'is at war,' during
which time 'no one would question but that govern16

li§lL_X~Times Company v. Uniteg States, 91 S.Ct.
2140 (1971}, p. 2147. According to the Meiklejohnian interpretation, the historical study on Vietnam policy fell
into the class of expression that had "governing importance." Therefore, Brennan afforded it aosolute protection.
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ment might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number or location of
troops.17
18

He concluded that since the nation was not at war,

the

government's action constituted a prior restraint of the
press that clearly violated the freedom of expression.
At issue in Broadric]Lv.._oklahoma

(1~73) 19 was the

state of Oklahoma's statute forbidding "public" political
. 't y 20 b y s t ate empl oyees. Th e supreme cour t up h e ld
act1v1
the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that its
overbreadth was not substantial.

Brennan dissented.

He

argued that the statute was impermissibly vague because it
failed "to provide the necessary 'sensitive tools' to carry
out the 'separation of legitimate from illegitimate
17
18

Ibid,, P• 2147.

1n terms of the constitution, Brennan did not look
upon Vietnam as a war because United states' military involvement in southeast Asia never was pursuant to a formal
congressional declaration of war. At most, the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution of 1~64 was an informal declaration, but in
January 1971, congress repealed it.
19
Justices Lewis :t·. Powell and william H. Rehnquist
had joined the court in Octooer, 1972. Along with Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun they combined
to form a strong law-and-order bloc. After 1975, this
bloc, al.though not always coherent, became the majority
with the addition of Justice John Paul Stevens. In many
cases, Brennan reacted to this oloc, thus, making his liberalism more pronounced.
20
This activity included engaging in political-fund
raising, belonging to any political party committee, being
an officer or member of any partisan political club, running for any paid public office, or taking part in the
management or affairs of any political party or campaign.
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speech. 11121

consequently, according to him, the Act was

"capable of application that would prohibit speech and conduct clearly protected by the Eirst Amendment,

1122

and as

such, i t violated the guarantee of free expression.
In colwnbia Broadcasting

~tern.

Inc. y, Democratic

National commission {1973), the Supreme Court held that the
"public interest" standard of the communication Act of 1934
did not require radio and television stations to sell
broadcasting time for editorial advertising.
a dissenting opinion.

Brennan wrote

He claimed that the principle at

stake was one of fundamental importance, for it concerned
the people's right to partake in vigorous debate through
the broadcast media.

He proceeded from the assumption,

contrary to the court, that "it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the broadcasters, which is paramount.1123

He proclaimed that the .tirst Amendment "itself

testifies to our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wideopen. 1124

He argued that "'it is only

through free debate and free exchange of ideas that govern21

Broadrict y. Oklahoma, 93 s.ct. 2908 (1973), p.

2924.
22

Ibid,, p. 2924,

23

~~iA Broadcasting System. Inc. y, Democratic
National commission, 93 s.ct. 2080 (1973), p. 2127. Furtherance of "self-governing powers" is contingent upon an
informed public, i.e., viewers and listeners.

Jbid~,

24

P• 2127.
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ment remains responsive to the will of the people and
peaceful change is effected.

1

"

25

Moreover, he asserted

that this commitment to "uninhibited, robust, and wideopen"
public de.bate is only realized if it is allowed to operate
in an effective forum.

The fact that in the

1~60's

thou-

sands of Americans took to the streets to publicize their
grievances seems to prevade his opinion.

Indeed, he wrote:

For our citizens may now find greater than ever
the need to express their own views directly to
the public, rather than through a governmentally
appointed surrogate, if they are to feel that they
can achieve at least some measure of control over
their own destinies.26
A candidate for the Ohio General Assembly in the district including the city of shaker Heights sought to purchase placard space on the vehicles of the city's Rapid
Transit system.

The system's advertising agent intorrned

the candidate that although space was then available, the
company's contract with the city forbade display ot political messages.

Indeed, the transit system had never accept-

ed such advertisements, but had regularly accepted commercial ones, as well as messages for churches and public service organizations.

In Lehm.g.n v.

ci~2t-~A!5.er

Heights

{1974), Justice Blackmun, speaking for a court plurality,
declared that the placard space was not a :First Amendment
forum: therefore, the refusal to accept political adver25

Ibi~, p. 2127.
~bid., p. 2123.

26

42
tisements did "not rise to the dignity of a r··irst Amendment
violation."

Brennan, in a passionate dissent, held that

the city's content-based ban violated the Eirst and Fourteenth Amendments.

He claimed that by accepting and dis-

playing commercial and public service advertisements on its
rapid transit system, the city opened a forum for communication.

He declared that once a city created such a forum,

it could not in accordance with free expression principles
discriminate solely on the basis of subject matter or content.

He concluded that the court's "sanction of the

city's preference for bland commericialism and noncontroversial public service messages over 'uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open debate on public issues,'" in effect, reversed the traditional priorities of the E'irst Amendment.
In

~x._y.

spoc~

27

(1976), the Supreme court upheld

the constitutionality of federal military regulations which
banned speeches and demonstrations of a political partisanship nature and prohibited distribution of literature, on a
military base, in this case Eort Dix, New Jersey, without
prior approval by headquarters.

In a vigorous dissent,

Brennan proclaimed that it is naive to believe that the
military, given the fact that its interests and purposes
are peculiarly affected by political affairs, is valueneutral; therefore, allowing candidates of all persuasions,
27

Lebman v. city of Shalter
(1974), p. 2723.

Hai~. 94 s.ct. 2714
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including anti-military ones, to be heard on military bases
might have a moderating effect on the inherent politicization of the military.

In addition, he drew heavily upon

an earlier precedent.

In the earlier case of Elower v,

IJ.nited

~tates

(1972), the Court held that a peaceful leaf-

leteer could not be excluded from the main street of a military installation to which the civilian public had been
permitted virtually unrestricted access.

Although the pri-

vate parties in Greer included one of the nation's most
vociferous opponents of the exercise of military power,
Brennan argued that the two cases (i.e., ,t·lower and Greer)
could not be distinguished on t·irst Amendment grounds.

As

a result, he concluded that the regulations as applied in
~.X

violated the :tirst Amendment.
f:irst_Ji.ational Bank of

~QILV•

Be!,!otti (1978) is

one of the few cases in which Brennan sided with the government in the area of free expression.

Moreover, the case

illustrates, perhaps better than any other, his adherence
to the .Meiklejohnian interpretation.

Justice Powell, writ-

ing for the majority, held that corporate expenditures in
connection with referenda material was protected by the
lrirst Amendment.

Brennan joined in Justice White's dis-

senting opinion.

\-white argued that "the communications of

profit-making corporations are not 'an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and the affirmation of self,'" nor do they "represent a manifestation
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of individual freedom of choice. 1128

He concluded:

There can be no doubt that corporation expenditure in connection with referenda material to
corporate business affairs falls clearly into the
category of corporation activities which may be
barred. The electoral process, of course, is the
essence of our democracy.
It is an arena in which
the public's interest in preventing corporation
domination and the coerced support by shareholders
of causes with which they disagree is at its
strongest and any claim that corporation expenditures are integral to the economic functioning of
the corporation is at its weakest.29
one of the most controversial issues today is the relationship between a free press and fair trials.
sue was presented to the court in the cases of
Press A§..§ociation v. Stuart (1976)

30

This is-

~~

and Bichm.Qnd News-

28 First Nation.al Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 98 s.ct.
1407 (1978), p. 1431.
29

1bid., p. 1439. Brennan believes that organized
labor's use of fair share monies in connection with referenda material also is not afforded First p~endment protection, for it, like corporate expenditures, clogs the channels necessary for realization of the citizenry's "selfgoverning powers" by circumscribing individual freedom of
choice.
see Abood_y_._Det~it Board of E.Qy~Qll. 97 s.ct.
1782 (1977).
30

The case grew out of a multiple murder in a small
Nebraska town which in".mediately attracted widespread local,
regional, and national coverage.
A suspect, Lrwin Charles
Simants, was arrested and charged with murder of six members of a family in their home in connection witn sexual
assault.
Before the preliminary hearing to determine
whether simants should be bound over for trial, the county
judge on motion of the prosecution and defense counsel entered a broad restrictive order barring the publication of
a vaguely defined category ot information including all
testimony and evidence introduced at the public preliminary hearing.
The supreme court unanimously struck down
the order on l"irst l'.mendment grounds.

45
..
. .
( 1uao)
Qapers, Inc. v, Vixg1.nia
~
•.31

clear:

Brennan's approach is

he calls for an absolute rule that resort to prior

restraints on the freedom of press is never a constitutionally permissible method of protecting the right to a fair
trial.

He wrote concurring opinions in both cases to em-

phasize this approach.

In the former case, he wrote, "I

unreservedly agree with Justice Black that 'free speech and
fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our
. ·1·iza t 'ion. ,,.32
civi

He asserted that

commentary and reporting on the criminal justice
system is at the core of the E·irst Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to citizens concerned
with the administration of government. secrecy of
judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the competence and impartiality of judges: free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the rule of law
and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system, as well as improve
the quality of that system by subjecting it to the
cleansing effects ot exposure and public accountability. 33
31on trial for the fourth time on the same murder
charge, one John Stevens moved to close the courtroom to
the public in order to prevent testimony from being relayed to remaining witnesses and to ensure that jurors did
not obtain information about the case outside the courtroom. The judge granted the request. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. promptly sought to have the order vacated. The court,
in a plurality opinion, vacated the closure order because
the judge had failed to "take the public character of the
trial into account."

32

li§bratka fress
(1976), p. 2828.
33 Ibid,, p. 2816,

Association~~~.S,

96 S.Ct. 2791
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~&oreover,

he rejected the notion that a choice between the

two values was necessary.

He argued that "judges possess

adequate tools short of injunction against reporting" by
the press tor relieving the tension between rirst and Sixth
Amendment values. 34

He conceded that the available al-

ternatives "may require greater sensitivity and etfort on
the part o:t the judges. 1135

He concluded, however, "that

sensitivity and effort is required in order to ensure the
full enjoyment and proper accommodation of both First and
Sixth Amendment rights.
In

R!cil.mQ.wLlJ~~~~'

Brennan argued that the rirst

. right
.
. 1 • 37
Amen d rnent secures a pu bl ic
of access to a t ria
He argued that "the rirst l\mendment embodies more than a
commitment to free expression and communicative interchange
for their own sakes; it has a

~~tural

X2J&. to play in

securing and fostering our republic system ot self-govern34

1bid,, p. 2828. These "adequate tools" include the
trial judge's control over who will try the facts:
he can
eliminate potential jurors who exhibit a prejudice as a
result of inflammatory news accounts; he can sequester jurors from one another, and from prejudicial news reports;
and finally, if necessary, he can change the venue of the
trial.
J5Th;d
2828.
~.l:U,.1 p.
36

.l&>i.d..._, p. 2828.

37

Like the right of access to publications, the public right of access to a trial emanates from the penumbras
of the :t·irst Amendment.
See note 9, supra.
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ment." 38

He claimed that .. under our system, judges are not

mere umpires, but, in our own sphere, lawmakers--a coordi39
nate .branch of government."
He asserted, therefore, that
the trial was a genuine governmental proceeding.

Because

he believes that "valuable public as \Well as civic behavior
must .be informed," 40 he concluded that public access to
trials is essential to maintaining public confidence in the
administration of justice.
The striking thing in Richmond is Brennan's use of
the term "structural role."
tice, 11 as described .by

The model of "Structual Jus-

'l1 ribe,

"seeks to achieve such ends

as human freedom not through any one characteristic structure of choice, but through that combination of structures
that seems .best suited to those ends in a particular context. 1141

£or Brennan, the structural role of the rirst

Amendment seeks freedom of expression through the combination ot structures best suited to realizing the republic
system of self-government.

The tact that this sounds like

the Neiklejohnian interpretation is not .by coincidence.
In short, Brennan borrowed Tribe's term "structural role"
because it clearly defined his established view, consonant
38

fil,~.bm..Qrui_.Ijewspa~~L

2814 (1980), p. 2833.
39

.lJ;>~. p. 2828.

4 0ibid., p. 2828.
41

Tribe, pp. 1137-1146.

Inc. v.s._Yliginli• 100

s. Ct.

48
with Meiklejohn, that the First Amendment rights of speakers and listeners to communicate freely do not exist solely to protect the intrinsic value of self-expression, but
also to preserve the process of

self-governrnent~the

re-

tention of meaningful control over government through publie discussion of its operation.
The city of San Diego, in its campaign of beautification, enacted an ordinance that totally banned billooards.

In t4etromedia, Inc. v. city of San_JJli.gQ

(1~81),

a supreme court plurality, using a bifurcated approach,
held that San Diego's ban of noncommercial billboards violated free expression, but that its ban of commercial ones
did not.

Brennan wrote a concurrence to register his

objection to the majority's bifurcated approach.

He pro-

claimed that its distinction between commercial billboards
and noncommercial ones created E·irst Amendment problems at
least as serious as those raised by a total ban.

He wrote:

In individual cases, this distinction is anything but clear. Because making such determinations would entail a substantial exercise of discretion by city's officials, it presents a real
danger of curtailing noncommercial speech in the
guise of regulating commercial speech.42
He believes that this danger is indeed real because cities
are not equipped to make decisions "based on the content
of speech. 1143

Moreover, he argued that San Diego was un-

42

~omedia, Inc. y, City
2882 (1981), p. 2907.
43

Ibid&, P• 2908.

Q'

San Diego, 101 S.Ct.
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able to show that a sufficiently substantial interest was
furthered by the total ban. 44

Thus, he concluded, unlike

the plurality, that the ordinance's ban of commerical and
noncommercial oillboards was unconstitutional.

grew out of the respondents' claim that the school board's
removal of nine books 45 from the shelves of the local
Junior High school and High school violated their First
Amendment rights.

Brennan, speaking for a three-member

plurality, balanced the school .board's legitimate interest
in controlling the curriculum and the classroom against the
individual's .tirst hltlendment right to the free access to
information and ideas. 46

On the one hand, he wrote:

44~o
· t 'ice t h a t Brennan is
. ba l anc1ng.
.
. l ance d th e
He oa
city of San Diego's interest in creating a "beautiful" environment against the guarantee of free expression, and determined that this interest was not compelling enough to
abridge the guarantee.
~hy did he balance?
The answer
lies in the tact that billboards are not of real "governing
importance." Indeed, one would be hard pressed to show
that they are.
45
The Board of hducation characterized the removed
.books as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-semitic, and
just plain filthy." These .oooks were Slall9~L..Hou~tiv.§
by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; J":WL.Rgked JU,?e, by Desmond ~iorris;
~n....l'~se Me.QIL..S~ll§.t!h by Piri Thomas; ~-ShQ-'.LStories
by Negro wri.tiu-A, edited by Langston Hughes; ~~~ice,
of anonymous authorship; ~.ack Boy, .by kichard wright; A
~2-.Ai~_li.Q.t,b~~.t.._~~ndwich, by Alice Childress;
~lll--21L~i!, .by ~ldridge Cleaver; A.. Reader fOL..bll.t§.1;.§,
edited oy Jerome Archer, and The F~!i.l:• by Bernard Malamud.
46
Brennan generally balances in cases involving minors because he believes that the E'irst JiJnendrnent does not
afford them the full protection it does adults. see pages
65-66.
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local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way
as to transmit community values,' and that 'there
is a legitimate and substantial community interest
in promoting respect for authority and traditional

values be they social, moral, or political.47
But, on the other hand, he wrote, "the constitution protects the rights to receive information and ideas (as) an
inherent corrolary of the rights of free speech and
press. 1148

He resolved the conflict by focusing on the in-

tent ot the school board.

"Local school boards must dis-

charge their 'important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions,'" he proclaimed, "in a manner that comports with
the transcendent imperatives of the E'irst Amendment.

114

~

Echoing the Meiklejohnian interpretation, he declared that
they
may not remove books from school library shelves
simply because they dislike the ideas contained in
those books and seek by their removal to 'prescrioe what shall be orthodox in politics, na~ion
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion.SO
He thus remanded the case to the lower courts tor re-hearing in accordance
~

~ith

the "political intent" test.

is striking, for it illuminates many ot the tac-

tors underlying Brennan's l:-'irst Amendment a_t:>proach.
47

s.ct.

~~ ot Education, Island Trees, Etc. v.
2799 (1982), ~· 2806.

48

.ll2iQLI P• 2808.

4~Tbh;'~

~LI

50

PP• 2806-2807.

1.&>isis_, p. 2810.

one,

~ico,

102

51
the "political intent" test sounds quite similar to the
t-1eikle johnian "self-governing importance" test.

'l'wo, his

statement that the government may not prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, etc., is
the f undarnental belief in his :First p;nendment approach.
;;nd, three, this statement reflects the breakdown of ethical consensus.
In numerous contexts, Brennan has addressed the rirst
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association.
for the Court, Brennan held in
£.Qvaucement of

.cgJ.~

hriting

Natioll.91-.A§.§2~.t.!2.Il~

th~

People y. Button (1963), that

Virginia's ban .against .. the improper solicitation ot any
legal or professional business 1151 to include the NAACP's
legal activities abridged the First Amendment.

He argued

that its activities were modes of expression and association protected by the

~irst

Amendment.

He wrote:

'l1he

basic aims and purposes of the NhACP are to
secure the elimination of all racial barriers
which deprive Negro citizens of the privileges and
~urdens of equal citizenship rights in the United
states. ·ro this end the association engages in
extensive educational and lobbying activities.
It

51

As part of its program of "massive resistance" to
school desegregation, the Virginia legislature in 1956 made
it a misdemeanor for any person or organization not having
a pecuniary right or liability in a lawsuit to solicit
legal business for itself or any attorney. Brennan did not
shut his eyes to the legislature's motivation of opposition
and resentment of the civil rights movement spearheaded, at
that time, by the NAACP. Moreover, in this regard, he exhibited a consciousness of the historical context.

52
also devotes much ot its tunds and energies to an
extensive program of assisting certain kinds of
litigation on behalf of its declared purposes.52
He claimed, therefore, "in the context of NAACP objectives,
litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences," but rather, "a means for achieving the lawful objectives ot equality of treatment" by all levels of government "for all rr,embers of the Negro community in this country. 1153

In other words, he concluded that it W'as a form of

political expression.

This litigation, according to him,

made "possible the distinctive contribution of a minority
group to the ideas and belie:t:s of our society. 1154

He pro-

claimed that there W'as no doubt that the tirst Amendment
protects certain forms of orderly group activity.

He con-

eluded that the NAACP's litigation definitely fell W'ithin
that area of protection.
ln Cousins y.

~igoda

(1975), Brennan, speaking for

the court, held that the National Democratic Party and its
adherents enjoyed a constitutional right of
sociation under the Eirst Amendment.

~litical

as-

He W'rote:

There can no longer oe any doubt the ireedom ot
association with others for the common advancement
ot political beliefs and ideas is a torm of 'orderly group activity' protected by the Eirst and
52
~le

Hgtional Associgtion l"Or the Adv_gn~ent of Colored
83 s.ct. 328 (1963), p. 331.

v-~~Q.Il,
53

~..LI

P• 336.

54_
1-b.
~
_
l.~,
p. 337 •
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Eourteenth Amendments. The right to associate
with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of the basic constitutional freedom.SS
He argued that Illinois could show no compelling state interest justifying its injunction against the seating of the
~ro-Daley

delegates at the National Democratic convention

in 1972; 56 consequently, he declared that the injunction
violated the rirst

~~endment's

guarantee of freedom of as-

sociation.
In Urod v. Bl.l.h:ll§ (1976), noncivil service employees
of the cook county, Illinois, sheritt's office brought a
class action suit alleging that they were fired or threatened with dismissal for the sole reason that they were not
affiliated with or sponsored oy the political party of the
current sheriff.

In a plurality opinion, Brennan held that

the plaintiffs stated a valid claim for deprivation of constitutional rights secured by the rirst

P~endment.

He ar-

gued that the practice ot patronage dismissals clearly infringed the rirst Amendment rights ot noncivil service
employees.

He declared tnat the 1:)ractice was justitied

only when the government could show that it turthered some
governmental end.

He declared that the Sheritt's office

could not do so.
sscou.sins v. wigo~,
56

95 s.ct. 541 (1975), p. 547.

An Illinois appellant court upheld a lower court's
order preventing the 1972 Democratic convention from replacing certain delegates elected in conformity with Illinois law, but in violation of a party rule forbidding
slatemaking.

54

In sum, Brennan's approach in these cases reflect his
beliet that the guarantee of tree expression fosters the
values of democratic self-government.

His means hinge on

whether a form of expression is of "governing importance"
or not.

If it is, he has used an absolutist approach, and

if it is not, he has employed a balancing test which, consistent with his libertarianism, gives more weight to the
individual's right or the public right to know vis-a-vis
the governmental policy reasons for abridging it.

Of the

cases considered, his scale shifted in favor of the government only twice.

In

~llotti

and hbood, it did so because

of his view that corporate expenditures and organized labor's use of fair share monies in connection with reterenda
material suoverts the proper working of the political process.

In the next two chapters, I will examine Brennan's

ettorts in two equally critical free expression areas:
obscenity and libel.

J:ourtherance of "self-governing" pow-

ers, likewise, is the motivating force in his ooscenity and
libel opinions.

CHAPTER V
FIRST AMENDMENT/
FREE EXPRESSION & OBSCENITY
Prior to 1973, the Meiklejohnian influence was obvious
in Brennan's opinions concerning the interrelationship between free expression and ooscenity laws.

In these cases,

he adopted and applied a "redeeming social value" test.
This test was, as he admitted, a qualification of the
"self-governing importance" test.

In 1973, however, he re-

jected it, except in a narrow class of instances, in favor
of a more absolutist approach.

The breakdown of ethical

consensus, in particular the "sexual revolution" of the
1~60's

and 1970's, is possibly an underlying factor in his

rejection ot this test in the area of ooscenity.
In a series of cases between 1957 and 1973, Brennan,
by his own admission, unsuccessfully endeavored to formulate a comprehensive legal definition of obscenity and a
statement of the interrelationship between free expression
and obscenity laws.

He laid the groundwork for this un-

satisfactory formula in the seminal case at Roth_y...__JJ:nited
~tes

(1957).

At issue in Roth was the constitutionality

of a long-standing federal statute which provided for postal censorship of obscene materials.

Brennan, speaking for

56
the court, held that the law did not violate the ldrst
;Jnendment.

He contended that "the unconditional phrasing

of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every
utterance. 111

He argued that "the protection given speech

and press was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired oy the people."

2

Looking at the im-

plicit history of the First J4nendment, he determined that
obscenity was rejected "as utterly without redeeming social
importance. 113

He thus concluded that obscenity clearly

tell outside the Jdrst .P.mendment • s area of protection.

He

then proceeded to formulate a legal detinition of ooscenity.

He avoided the overly-broad definition that sex and

obscenity were necessarily synonymous.

Rather, he defined

obscene material as "material dealing with sex in a manner
appealing to (the) prurient interests 114 of the average person in the community.

F·inally, he proclaimed that the test

in each case, applying contemporary community standards,
was "the effect of the .oook, picture or publication consi' d ered as a whole." 5
1

2

~h

v.

Ibig_._, f>• 1308.

3 - .

4

unite.Q_.s_tat~,

1~1d11

p.

Ibig,

p. 1310.

I

130~.

5.lRi~. p. 1312.

77 s.ct. 1304 (1957) p. 1308.
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In

Kin.gsle~~oks,

Inc. v.

Bx.g~n

(1957), the court

upheld the constitutionality of a New York state statute
permitting a temporary injunction at the instance of a
municipal official, followed by a prompt trial at which, if
the matter involved is held to be obscene, a permanent injunction against its possession or sale will be issued and
the defendant ordered to surrender all copies to the sheriff tor destruction.

Brennan, dissenting, held that the

statute was inconsistent with

~

ford the defendant a jury trial.

because it did not afHe contended that the

jury, representing a cross-section of the community, had "a
special aptitude for reflecting the view of the average
person. 116

He concluded, therefore, that it provided "a

peculiarly competent application of the (Roth) standard ot
judging obscenity, 117
At issue in smith y, People ot__the state ot Cali_f ox::,

ni.9 (1959) was whether a Los .Angeles obscenity law, dispensing with the element of scienter (i.e., knowledge of
the .book's contents) and imposing strict criminal liability
on booksellers for possessing obscene material, violated
the r'irst .Amendment.

writing for the Court, Brennan con-

eluded that it did, tor it had a tendency to inhibit constitutionally protected expression.

He argued that it was

6 Kin~~~~~~.&.....V•
.
l
Brown, 77 s.ct. 1335 (1957)

p. 1331.
7
Ibi.Q.... , P• 1331,
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impossible for a oookseller to inspect all tne oooks on his
shelves to deterrr.ine whether they are ooscene or not.

He

thus declared that the ordinance's strict liability teature
had the ettect 01 seriously depleting the nuffioer of nonobscene oooks available on the oooksellers' shelves: thereoy, restricting the public's access to constitutionally
protected rEading matter.
ln lv'1arcus y. Search 'harrants ot Prot.)erty, l::.tc.L.
(1~61),

the Court, through Brennan, neld that

~articular

use ot the search and seizure t)Ower

~issouri's

8

to

su~.t?ress

ooscene publications involved abuses inimical to protected
expression.

He asserted that the line

net~een

legitimate

and illegi£imate speech was finely drawn, and as such
called tor sensitive tools.

He concluded that "rr;ass

seizure in the tashion ot tnis case was etfected without
any sareguards to ,,?rotect legitimate ex,t)ression. 119
8

A ~issouri law ~rovided that it a written corr.~laint
is ffiade under oath to a judge or magistrate which states
"positively and not upon intormation ot belief," or which
states facts trom which the judge rinds "pronable cause"
to believe, that ooscene material is being kept in a designated place, the judge shall issue a ~arrant directed
to any police otticer to search the premises and "to seize
and oring oetore such judge or ffiagistrate the personal
~roperty therein described.
9

~!ilL.Yi~..[.£b._j@Ilants o:t Pr~rty, t.t~, 81 s.
Ct. 1708 (1~61), p. 1719. A~proximately 11,000 copies of
280 alleged ooscene publications were seized ~ursuant to
a judge issued warrant. Two months later, a judge found
that only 100 at the 280 publications were in fact obscene:
thus, 180 nonobscene puolications, some of which were
magazines saleaole only when current, were kept from the
stands.
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At issue in l!@nual

~nt&Xuri~~·

Inc. v.

D~

(1~62)

was

postal suppression of three magazines devoted primarily to
portrayal of nude males.
the 1-irst Amendment.

The court held that it violated

In a concurring opinion, Brennan dis-

posed of the case by announcing that the Postmaster General
could not employ any process of his own to close the mails
to material he considers obscene, for congress' Comstock
Act 9 did not confer such a power upon him. Moreover, refleeting his general hostility to administrative censorship, 10 he wrote:
Congress could constitutionally authorize a noncriminal process in the nature of a judicial proceeding under closely defined procedural safeguards.
But the suggestion that Congress may constitutionally authorize any process other than a
fully judicial one immediately raises the gravest
doubts.11
In short, Brennan would declare unconstitutional any congressional authorization of noncriminal administrative censorship.
In

1~56,

the Rhode Island legislature created a com-

mission to "Encourage Morality in Youth" with a generous
mandate to educate the public on questions of obscene pub9

Enacted in 1873, the Comstock Act made it a federal
criminal offense to transport obscene materials through the
mails.
It authorized the Postmaster General to close the
mails QD~ after a determination of obscenity had been made
in a criminal prosecution of the sender.
10 See

pa~e

36, note 9, supra.

11
l
.
~ua
~nt~~ris~_.Inc.
(1962), p. 1453.

v.~.

82

s.ct.

1432
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lications and to investigate and recommend prosecutions.
In a continuing series of official letters, the Commission
informed wholesale distributors that enumerated books and
magazines had been declared by a majority Commission vote
to be objectionable for sale, distribution, or display for
youths under 18.

Bantam Books, Inc. brought suit alleging

that the commission's intimidating methods constituted a
violation of its

~irst

~

(1~63),

v. Sullivan

Amendment rights.

In

Jig~__!?ook.§..J.

Brennan, speaking for the major-

ity, held that the Commission's activities, in an attempt
to regulate obscene publications, inhibiteo the circulation
of publications that fell within the tirst J:Jnendrnent's area
of protection.

"It is characteristic of the freedoms of

expression in general," he claimed, "that they are vulnerable to gravely damaging yet barely visible encroachments." 12

He thus declared that "regulation of ooscenity

• • • must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks 1113 in
order to ensure the larger principle of free expression.
He concluded that the Commission's activities failed to
erect such bulwarks, and as such violated the

~irst

r~end-

ment.
12
12.sntam Book1.~.._JL.t_~ulliyan, 83 s.ct. 631 (1~63)
p. 637.
13
Ibid.._, p. 637.
"Adequate bulwarks" for Brennan,
consist of any means of regulating obscenity that does not
infringe in any way upon legitimate forms of expression.
His standard for adequacy was extremely high, particularly,
for consenting adults.
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~.bellis

L_Ohi.Q (1964) grew out of a state crimi-

nal conviction for exhibiting an allegedly obscene movie,
"Les Amants."

In a plurality opinion, Brennan proclaimed

that the issue of the proper standard for determining
whether material is obscene "has oeen subject to much discussion and controversy since our decision in Roth seven
years ago. 1114

He conceded that the Roth definition of ob-

scenity was imperfect, but reaffirmed nonetheless his commitment to it for want of a more workable one.

He then

proceeded to clarify the meaning of the standard.

He de-

clared that "a work cannot be prescribed unless it is 'ut. h out socia
. l
ter l y ' wit

.
..1s
importance.

In addition, he clar-

ified the "prurient interest" test by adding a new ingredient--the deviation from society's standards of decency.
He wrote:
It should be recognized that the Roth standard
requires in the first instance a finding that the
material 'goes substantially beyond customary
limits of such matter.•16
F'urthermore, he contended that it was incorrect to read the
14M:.gco bell;
~~·

oh'10,

84 s.ct. 1676 (1964), p. 1680.
This statement reflects the growing fragmentation within
the Court over the issue of obscenity.
15

1bid., p. 1680. The Court majority split on this
point: thereby, accounting for the plurality. Black and
Douglas stuck to their absolutist approach against regulation of obscenity, thus removing the need to define it.
On the other hand, Justice Potter Stewart clung to his visceral "I know it when I see it" test that defined obscenity
simply as "hard-core pornography."
16
Ibid., p. 1680.
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"contemporary community standard" aspect as requiring a determination of obscenity by "the standards of the particular local community from which the case arises. 1117

Rather,

he stated that the standard required a determination on the
oasis of a national standard.

"It is, atter all," he as-

serted, "a national constitution, we are expounding. 1118
Relying on his clarification of the Roth standard, he held
that the movie was not ooscene, tor it was not "utterly
without social importance," and as such the conviction for
showing it must be overturned.
writing tne court opinion in A_Qygntity of Q2µies ot
Books v. Kansas {1964), Brennan, drawing heavily upon
M.g~,

held that the procedures tallowed in issuing a war-

rant tor the seizure ot allegedly obscene books, and authorizing their impounding pending a hearing, violated the
.rirst Amendment because they did not adequately protect
against the suppression of nonobscene books.

"Constitu-

tionally protected expression," he declared, "is otten separated trorr. ooscenity by a dim and uncertain line. 111 :1

He

proclaimed, therefore, that the 1'"'irst Amendment "requires
a

~rocedure

'designed to focus searchingly on the issue of

17 Ioi'd • , p. 16 80 •
18

Ibi~~, p. 1682.

19A_Qyan t i' t y o{ Copies
.
of
84 s.ct. 1723 (1:164), p. 1726.

Books~state

of

l<ansa~,
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obscenity. 11120
Brennan added a new element to his standard of determining obscenity in

~nzburg__y-L-Ynited ~tates

(1~66).

Speaking for the court, he declared that evidence of "pandering in production and sale and publicity with respect to
publications 1121 was relevant in determining the ultimate
question of obscenity.

"The question of obscenity," he

wrote, "may include consideration of the setting in which
the publications were presented as an aid to determining
the question of obscenity. 1122

He asserted that, although

the accused publications were not in themselves obscene,
"exploitation of interests in tiitillation of pornography
through pervasive treatment or desription of sexual matters
may support the deterrnination 1123 to the contrary.

He con-

eluded that Ginzburg's "sole emphasis was on the sexually

1124
.
.
provoca t ive
aspec t s o f h.is puol.ication.

Consequent l y,

he sustained Ginzburg's criminal conviction under the federal Comstock Act.

20.l!?h.._,
n"; ~
p. 1 7 26.
21
Among the evidence in the present case was the fact
that Ginzburg had first sought mailing privileges for one
of the publications from the post off ices in Intercourse
and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania, and had later obtained them
from the postmaster in Middlesex, New Jersey.
22 . b
.
~nz urg y. Unit~~tes, 86 s.ct. 942 (1966),
pp. 44-45.
23 Ib'd
1 e
P• 950.
24
Ibig,, p. 947.
I
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In Mishkin v. New Yor.k (1966), a companion case to
Ginzbuxg, the court, through Brennan, applied the new notion of pandering to sustain the conviction of a New York
publisher for violating the state's obscenity law.

Fur-

thermore, he clarified the "average person" facet of the

HQ.:t.b "prurient interest" test.

He wrote, the material must

be assessed "in terms of the sexual interests of its in-

tended and probable recipient group. 1125
11he

Massachusetts supreme court held that

U,~_jjill,

the notorious eighteenth-century .book recounting a prostitutes intimate sexual experiences, was obscene and thus
subject to censorship.

commo~ll.b

In A_liQok

Lja~d

"Jobn__~ilg~

of fviassachusett.§ (1966), Brennan, speaking

for a court majority, declared that the lower court's holding was erroneous.

summarizing the development of his

standard for determining obscenity, he

~rote:

it must be established that (a) the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
a prurient interest in sex: (b) the material is
patently offensive relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters: and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. 26
He declared that these three elements must coalesce in order for a work to be declared obscene.

He concluded that

25 ~&U!!An....:i.&....li~
-• o"h1'k'
lr
Yoro'
86 S·. ct. 958 ( 1966)

26

A Book Named

Pleasure~__bj;torney

I

p. 964.

~bn.....c.J:~nd's Mell12.ir§ of a Woman of

Genexsl of the Commg.nwealth of Massak.buset.t§, 86 s.ct. 975 (1966), p. 977.
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the book, even though it failed when judged against the
first two criteria, was not obscene oecause it was not
without redeeming social value: at the very least, it had
a modicum of literary and historical value.
Ginsberg was convicted unoer a New York obscenity
law 27 for selling a sixteen-year-old .boy two "girlie magazines containing pictures of female nudes.

He petitioned

the supreme court to overturn his conviction on the ground
that the statute violated the i-·irst .hlllendment.

L. New York

(1~68),

In

~be..:g

Brennan, speaking for the court, denied

Ginsberg• s petition, for the law did not violate tne r·irst
rllllendment.

conceding that the magazines were not obscene

for adults, he contended, however, that the 6tate possesses
the power to adjust the definition of obscenity for minors
because it retains an inherent interest in their well-being.

He concluded that the law's "definition of obscenity

on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 had a rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors. 1128

27

jrhe statute made it unlawful for any person to sell
to minors under seventeen years of age any picture of similar representation "which depicts nudity, sexual conduct,
or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors,"
or any book or other printed matter which contains similar
material "or explicit or detailed verbal descriptions or
narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or
sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a w·hole is harmful to minors ...

28 .

™~g_ v.
h.OOY'

New--:t2n,

88 s.ct. 1274 (1968) p. 1274.
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Thomas I. Emerson sheds light on this delicate aspect
ot the obscenity problem.

He supports the ditferentiation

between adults and minors vis-a-vis tne £irst Amendment.
He asserts that the

~irst

/Jnendment does not afford minors

the full protection it does adults because they "(are) not
permitted that measure of independence, or aole to exercise
the maturity of judgment, which a system
.
sion
rests upon." 29

OL

free expres-

F'or want of a better test, h e recom-

mends a due process one--that the restriction oe a reasonable one.

He issued a caveat, however, that the restric-

tion pertaining to minors must not infringe upon an adult's
first

p~endment

rights.

By 1973, Brennan had oecome so frustrated in his endeavor to formulate a pertect definition of obscenity, that
he denounced it outright as an exercise in futility.

One

,t)Ossible, underlying factor in his sudden a.oandonment of
this endeavor was the fact that ethical consensus regarding what constituted "obscene" was breaking down with the
so-called "sexual revolution" of the

1~60's

and 1970's.

This revolution has led, in part, to greater discussion of
sexual matters and practices which, in turn, has desensitized many Pmericans to matters once considered obscene:
there.by, making them nonobscene.

In short, "obscene" has

oecome increasingly a relative term requiring individual
29

Thomas I. Emerson, The system ot Freedom of ExpresVintage Books, 1970), pp. 496-497.

§.i.Qn (New York:
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definitions of it, not a societal one.

Perhaps reflecting

this, Brennan simply came to the conclusion that the vexatious line between obscenity and other sexually oriented
but constitutionally protected expression was "too dim and
too uncertain"; thereby, defying attempts to define it.
Thus, he extricated himselt from this constitutional quagmire by moving toward, but not unconditionally embracing,
the absolutist approach.
This shift toward absolutism revealed itself, for the
first time, in his dissenting opinion in

~A-Adult

The-

atre Iv. Slaton (1973), a companion case to Miller v.
~for.nig

(1973).

In

Mill~,

a Burger court majority re-

shuffled the previously laid-down cards, many of which came
from Brennan's hand, concerning the regulation of obscenity.

The majority reaffirmed the Roth principle that ob-

sceni ty is not afforded E·irst P.Jnendrnent protection, rejected the

Mero~

"utterly without redeeming social value"

test, and adopted Justice John Marshall Harlan's earlier
view that in determining whether a work is ooscene courts
may apply state standards of candor and offensiveness
rather than national ones.

In capsulized torm, Burger

wrote:
A finding of obscenity will now turn on (a)
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find the work taken as
a whole, appealing to prurient interests; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
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whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientitic value.30
Brennan's dissent in

~Q.ll

covered both cases.

In a

remarkably frank confession, he announced that "our experi-

ence with the Rotb approach has certainly taugnt us that
the outright suppression o:t ooscenity cannot be reconciled
1#ith the tundamental principle ot the ~irst Amendment. 1131
He wrote:
Atter 16 years of experimentation and debate, I
am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that none
of the available formulas, including the one announced today (in hilJ&~), can reduce the vagueness
to a tolerable level ~hile at the same time striking an acceptable balance oetween protection of
the l:.'irst and :Fourteenth ~Jnendments, on the one
hand, and on the other the asserted state interest
in regulating the dissemination of certain sexually oriented materials.32
He asserted that "the concept ot 'ooscenity' cannot oe defined with sutf icient specificity and clarity

* * *

~revent su.ostantial erosion of protected speech. 1133

to
con-

trary to the absolutist approach, he stuck to his view
that the government may suppress "sexually oriented materials on the basis ot their allegedly 'ooscene' contents" in
instances involving "distrioution to juveniles and ootru9!0
30
3

Millfil.....Y.&....Cal.itorny, 93

~is Adu.l..t._~tre

(1973), p. 2647.
32

33

Ibi~, p. 2647.
Ibis;b_, p. 2657.

s.ct.

2607

(1~73).

I v. Slaton, 93 s.ct, 2628
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sive exposure to unconsenting adults. 1134

But in all other

instances, he concluded "the rirst and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state and F'ederal Government from at. l s. 35
wholly to suppress " such materia

terr~pting

In the early afternoon of October 30,

1~73,

a

~ew

York City radio station {WBAI) licensed to the Pacitica
:toundation broadcast a prerecorded monologue oy the comedian George Carlin as part of a discussion of contemporary
attitudes toward language.

rhe monologue, entitled "F'ilthy

1

words," repeated a variety of colloquialisffis or seven words
which Carlin quipped could never be said on puolic airwaves.

Just before airing the skit, the

~rogram's

host

advised listeners that the record contained "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some."

Five

weeks later, the Federal Communications Commission received
a complaint aoout the program trom a listener who had heard
the oroadcast while driving with his tifteen-year-old son.
The

~cc

thereafter issued an order oanning future broad-

casting of the monologue because ot its use of indecent
34

1bid., p. 2662. This qualification separates
Brennan from the absolutists such as Black and Douglas.
~oreover, this qualification concurs with ~merson's theory
on the proolern ot ooscenity. see Emerson, pp. 502-503:
0
Dissernination of erotic materials to those who voluntarily
choose to read or see them would be protected under the
Eirst ~.mendment. Forcing such material upon individuals
who did not want them, or did not want their children to
have them, or upon the public at large, would .be prohibitaole."
35 .. d
ll21r,g.L , p. 2 6 6 2 •
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.f'.Qlll}Q.9tion (1978), the supreme court, through Justice
Stevens, upheld the FCC's order.
and passionate dissent.

Brennan f.iled a vigorous

He wrote:

I find the court's misapplication of fundamental
t·irst Amendment principles so patent, and its attempt to impose its notion ot propriety on the
whole of the American people so misguided that I
am unable to remain silent.36
He argued that acceptable words or expression vary according to ditfering socio-economic backgrounds.

In this con-

text, he viewed the court's decision as "another of tne
dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups
who do not share its mores to conform to its way 01 think.
ing
, ac t 'ing , and s peak'ing. 11 37

He concluded tnat this

"acute ethnocentricism, 11 in effect, inhibited those broadcasters desiring to reach those people who were not members
of the dominant culture.

He agreed wholeheartedly with the

Court's contention that the Bill of Rights guaranteed "an
individual's right 'to be let alone' when engaged in private activity within the confines of his own home. 1138
36

He

f:§~ral Commynication~ommisaion y. Paci,ti.sa._Eoundation, 98 s.ct. 3026 (1978}, p. 3047.
37
l,&>id., p. 3055. His abhorence of forced cultural
conformity is a statement of his idealistic vision of liberalism. Moreover, it may derive, in part, from the breakdown of ethical consensus (i.e., the movement toward ethical relativism).
38~~.
. ;~
p. 3048.
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argu~d,

however, that "the radio is undenia.bly a public

medium" which does not "implicate tundamental privacy interests.1139

Listening to the radio, according to him, is a

. voluntary act to partake in an ongoing public discourse.
since it is voluntary, he declared, the individual can
change the channel or turn it off, if. the discourse is
found to be offensive.

In other words, he .believes that a

radio broadcast can never constitute an "obtrusive exposure
to an unconsenting adult."
In NewJ.QXk

v.J.§~X

(1~82),

the court unanimously

upheld a New York criminal statute oanning the distribution of nono.bscene material depicting sexual conduct by
cnildren.

The case grew out ot the

1~78

criminal convic-

tion of Paul Ferber, the proprietor ot a Manhattan bookstore specializing in sexually oriented products, for selling

t~o

films devoted almost exclusively to depicting young

boys masturoating, to an undercover police otficer.

In a

concurring opinion, Brennan clung to his "view (expressed
in Slaton) that, in the absence ot exposure, or particular
harm to juveniles or unconsenting adults that state lacks
power to suppress sexually oriented materials. 1140

since

the case brought one of his excepting criteria-particular
harm to juveniles-into play, he applied the "utterly with-

39
40
3365.

~... ,

p. 3048.

New York_y_,__~rbe~, 102 s.ct. 3348 (1982), p.
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out social value" test.

Consi~ering

the harm to juveniles

posed by the production and distribution ot the films, he
claimed that their "tiny traction" of "serious literary,
artistic, scientific, or medical value" did not justify
striking oown the statute.
In sum, Brennan initially relied upon the "redeeming
social value" test in obscenity cases.

Later, perhaps

tueled partly oy the oreakdown of ethical consensus, he rejected it, except in a narrow class of instances, in tavor
of a more aosolutist approach oecause the line .bet'tVeen obscene and legitimate expression defies clear definition.
Underlying this rejection is his condemnation of selt-censorship deriving from official action that "creates a zone
of uncertainty into which only the hardiest, not necessarily wisest, will dare to enter for fear of crossing the
ooundary from licit to illicit speech. 041

In addition,

the tact that obscene expression neither advances or retards the citizenry's self-governing powers is a critical
factor behind this rejection.
sion is not neutral.

Conversely, libelous expres-

Thus, Brennan has continued to rely

upon the "social value test" in libel cases.

rv1oreover, his

distaste of self-censorship is particularly evinced in
these cases.

In the next chapter, I intend to examine his

efforts in this area.

41

Arthur J. Goldberg, "Mr. Justice Brennan and the
:t·irst Amendment," Rutgers-Camden Law Journal, 4 (Fall,
1~72), p. 12.

CHAPTER VI
FIRST AMENDMENT/
FREE EXPRESSION & LIBEL
In 1964, Brennan embarked on his attempt to formulate
a standard defining the interrelationship
Amendment and libel laws.

New

( 1964) is the seminal case.

Yo~

bet~een

Times v.

the

~irst

sull~n

'rhe case required the court

to determine for the first time the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a
state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by
a public official against critics of his official conduct.
It had its origin in an advertisement published in
~rk

~~

Tirn!i§ charging the police and city commissioners ot

Montgomery, Alabama, with instituting an "unprecedented
wave of terror" in their attempt to suppress various desegregation activities.

Significantly, several of the state-

ments in the advertisement were erroneous, at least in detail, and a Montgomery city commissioner had promptly sued
the newspaper for libel.

Brennan, writing for an unanimous

court, contended that the case must be considered "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should uninhibited,
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robust, and wide-open." 1

He further contended that public

debate "may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public off i"Erroneo~s statement is inevitable in free de-

cials. "2

bate," he wrote, consequently, "it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need * * *to survive. 113

He argued, however,

that the :r·irst Amendment did not protect all erroneous
statements.

An erroneous statement that was libelous,

ac-

cording to him, fell outside the area of protected expression.

He defined a libelous statement as one made "with

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."

He concluded that the defen-

dant's claim of libel was unjustified, for he failed to
show "actual malice" on the part of the publisher.
A district attorney's conviction under the Louisiana
Criminal Defamation statute for remarks critical of judges
in his district initiated the case of

(1964).

~...:isQn-Y.s.._l..,Quis~

Brennan, speaking for the court, held that the

~~--i:Qx!L~~~

rule limited state power to impose criminal

sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public
officials.
1

p. 721.

2
3

He asserted that debate on public issues must

~XQ.:&._Times v~~livan,
Ibid., p. 721.
1bid., p. 721.

84

s.ct. 710 (1964),
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be uninhibited, and that "utterances honestly believed"
must be protected because they "contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. 114

He

contended that just because "speech is used as a tool for
political ends does not automatically bring it under the
mantle of the constitution." 5 "The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth," he proclaimed, "do not enjoy constitutional
protection. 116

He wrote:

Calculated falsehood falls into that class of
utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.7
The origin of

Ros~att y~~

(1966) was a news-

paper columnist's criticism of the operation of a state
recreation center and ski resort of which Baer had been
supervisor.

Baer brought suit tor libel, alleging the col-

urnn had imputed mismanagement and peculation to him.
plurality opinion, Brennan declared that the

In a

~lL.XQ.;"k....tim~

rule applied "to those among the hierarchy of government
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
4

.

~ison

5

Ibid., p. 216.

6

1bid., p. 216.

7

ll?is!.a.

I

.

.

JU_Louisiana,

P• 216 •

85 S.Ct. 209 (1964), p. 215.
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governmental affairs."

He argued that in the field of

libel, "there must be evidence showing that the attack was
read specif.ically directed at the plaintiff. 118

He contend-

ed that "criticism of government is at the very center of
the constitutionally protected area of free discussion. 119
He concluded that "criticism of those responsible for governrnent operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized."lO
In

~~~.._yi_Hill

(1967), Brennan, speaking for

the Court, ruled that the New
to a privacy suit.
~

Xo~k

Time4 standard applied

The case grew out of the publication by

magazine of a series of pictures taken from a play

that portrayed in fictionalized fashion an incident in
which escaped convicts had invaded the Hill home and held
the members of the family
~

captiv~

for nineteen hours.

The

story identified the play as based originally on the

Hill family's experience, but failed to make clear its fietionalized character.

Even though the

~

story contained

nothing libelous or disgraceful in any way concerning
the Hill family, Hill nonetheless promptly sued the publishers of the magazine for invasion of his privacy under
a New York Civil Code forbidding such invasions for commer8
9

Rosenbl1tt

v~~.

1biQ..., p. 676.

lOibid,, p. 676.

86 s.ct. 669 (1966), p. 542.
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cial purposes.

Brennan argued that "the exposure of self

to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in
. ·1·ize d comrnuni•t y. 1111
a civi

He further argued that this was

particularly so "in a society which places a primary value
on freedom of speech and of press. 1112

He concluded:

we create a grave risk of serious impairment of
the indispensable service of a free press in a
free society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the
facts associated in news articles with a person•s
name, picture or portrait, particularly as related
to non-defamatory matter.13

HiJJ..

is an illuminating case, for it brought about a

conflict between two libertarian values---f ree expression
14
.
an d privacy.
Brennan believes that the former, echoing
the Neiklejohnian interpretation, is "the essence of democratic self-government," and that the latter is an implicit
right secured by the Bill of Rights. 15
11

while both are

TimeL Inc, v, Hill, 87 s.ct. 534 (1967),

~- 542.

12 Ibid,, p. 542,
13 Ibid,, p. 542.
14

As pointed out earlier, Brennan's Bill of Rights
efforts are motivated by either his desire for democratic
self-government, or his respect for personal privacy.
1n Griswold ~_connecticut (1965), the court established a new constitutional "right to privacy."
Brennan joined in Douglas' majority opinion. Therein,
Douglas wrote, "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. such penumbras
guaranteeing zones of privacy for the individual lie around
the guarantees of the ~·irst, 1''ourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments as protection against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man's house."
15
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precious, the former is more so.

Indeed, tor Brennan, free

expression is the most precious of all the Bill of Rights'
guarantees.
In RQsenoloom v. Metromedia, Inc.

(1~71),

Brennan

took a significant step toward the absolute immunization
of the news media from libel judgments.

The case present-

ed the question whether the New York TimJi§ knowing-or-reekless-falsity rule was applicable in a state civil lioel
action brought by a private individual for an erroneous
statement uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station.
In a plurality opinion, Brennan held that it did apply.

He

argued that "drawing a distinction between 'public' and
'private' figures makes no sense in terms ot the First
.Amendment guarantees. 1116

Instead, he claimed that a dis-

tinction between events of public concern and those not of
public concern was a more meaningful one, for it considers
both the public's need to know and the individual's interest in privacy.

He contended that "voluntary or not, we

are all 'public' men to some degree." 17

He concluded that

"we honor the commitment to robust debate on pu.blic issues

* * *

by extending constitutional protection to all discus-

sion and communication involving matters of public or gener a.l concern. 1118
16

Rosen.bloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
(1971), p. 1821.
17 Ib'd
J. • ' p. 1822.
18

Ibida_, P• 1820.

~1 S.Ct. 1811
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In Gertz Y..s.._Robert belch, Inc.

(1974), the Court

overturned Brennan's decision in Rosenb.l&Qm with respect to
dra"Wing a distinction between "public and private" figures.
In a dissenting opinion, Brennan reaffirmed his commitment
to Rosenbloom.

He wrote:

~e strike the proper accommodation between
avoidance of media self-censorship and protection
of individual reputations only when we require
states to apply the New York Times knowing-orreckless-f alsity standard in civil libel actions
concerning media reports of the involvement of
private individuals in events of public or general
interest.19

In rebruary 1973, the CBS documentary program "Sixty
£¥iinutes" carried a segment entitled "The Selling of colonel
Herbert," narrated by .fviike wallace and produced and directed by Barry Lando.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Herbert, a

war hero suddenly relieved of his battalion command in
Vietnam, had publicly accused his superior otficers ot
covering up American atrocities.

The broadcast segment

juxtaposed filmclips of Wallace's interviews with Herbert
and his detractors in a manner casting doubts on Herbert's
accusations.
for libel.

Herbert promptly sued Lando,
In

~~ert..,JU.~~

~allace,

and CBS

(1979), Brennan agreed with

the majority's rejection of respondents' claim that an
"editorial privilege" shields from discovery information
that would reveal respondents' editorial process.

!~Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc.&.,
p. 1821.

He di-

94 S.Ct. 2997 (1974),
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verged from it, however, oy holding that "the :rirst Amendment requires predecisional communication among editors to
.
. l
b e protected by an e d itoria

. · 1 ege. .. 20
privi

h . privi
. . l ege.
Tis

must yield, he conceded, when "a t)Ublic tigure plaintiff
is able to demonstrate to the prima-f acie satisfaction of
a

tri~l

judge that the libel in question constituted de-

f amatory talsehood. 1121

He asserted that the :tounding

F'athers valued liberty both as an end and as a means.

"In

its instrumental aspect," he proclaimed, "the First Amendment serves to foster the values of democratic selt-government. 1122

He declared that "it is a great mistake to under-

stand this aspect of the Eirst Amendment solely through the
filter of individual rights. 1123

In short, he concluded:

An editorial privilege would thus not be merely
personal to respondents, but would shield the press
in its function 'as agents of the public at large.'
The press is the necessary representative of the
public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which effects the public's right.24

Brennan's statement that the r·irst Amendment's instrumental aspect is understood best through more than the
filter of individual rights is certainly a striking one.

ror him, the F'irst Amendment does more than confer individ20

~l;!grt

21T"h;~
~.... ,

y.

Lando, 99

s.ct.

1635 (1979), p. 1651.

p. 1651.

22n,;
~
Speaking in terms of "governing
~~' p. 1653.
importance" reflects his commitment to the Meiklejohnian
interpretation.
23 Ibid,, p, 1654,
24 Ibid,, p. 1656,

81

ual rights.

In its instrumental aspect, it protects both

the individual's right to speak and the public's right to
know.

'I'he public• s right to know is the oasis of his ap-

proach in libel cases.

Indeed, in this area, he attaches

more importance to this right than the individual's right
to speak.
another.

Of course at times, the two rights mirror one
As Tribe asserts, however,

the right to know at times means more: it may
include an individual's right to acquire desired
information or ideas free of governmental veto,
undue hinderance, or unwarranted exposure. such
a right to know may entail no correlative right
in any particular source to originate the comrnunications. 25
Moreover, this statement echoes the Meiklejohnian interpretation.

Brennan wrote, "(t)hese powers which (Meiklejohn)

labelled powers of 'governing importance,' are concerned,
not with a private right, but with a public power, a governmental responsibility. 1126
In sum, Brennan continues to adhere to a "redeeming
social value" test in the area of libel.

He does so

because he believes that calculated falsehoods or a wanton
disregard for the truth, works to the detriment of
cratic self-government.
lead to its downfall.

demo~

Indeed, he thinks that they could

Of interest in the cases considered,

however, is the fact that he did not sustain a single libel
25 Tribe, pp. 675-676.
26
srennan, "The Meiklejohn Interpretation," p. 12.
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judgment.

Thus, though his approach in this area is not

absolute, his results tend to be.
'rhe Meiklejohn interpretation of the 1::•irst Amendment

is the skeletal framework of Brennan's free expression approach.

Like Meiklejohn, he believes that the rirst Amend-

ment absolutely protects expression of "governing importance."

Over the years, he has fleshed out this skeleton

by bringing expression of "social value" into the contours
of this absolute protection.
~as

This tleshing out process

tueled partly by the breakdown of ethical consensus,

and by the increasing absolutism in the scholarly studies
he has relied u,t.X>n such as the \Writings of Emerson and
Tribe.

~merson's

area of obscenity.

influence is clearly evidenced in the

CHAPTER VII
f OURI'H J.:JVlENLMENT

American criminal procedure is outlined in the Fourth,
Fifth, and sixth Amendments.

The conceptual nasis for

Brennan's efforts in this area is threefold:

(1) a deep

commitment to the values of individual liberty as embodied
in the right of personal privacy 1 and human dignity: (2)
the value of a neutral and detached magistrate 2 : and (3)
the spectre of "police state" activity and an indignation
at the police cutting corners.

over the years, Brennan's

approach in this area has become increasingly rigid and absolute in tavor of the individual.
underly this movement.

A number of factors

One, prior to his appointment to

the supreme Court, Brennan had shown an interest in, and
indeed had advocated more enlightened criminal and
trial procedures. 3

This interest carried over to his ef-

forts in the area of criminal procedure.
01· guard between 1969 and

1~75,

Two, the change

from the libertarian Warren

Court to the law-and-order Burger court is a pronounced
1

see page 77, note 15, supra.

2

Stephen J. F'riedman, "Mr. Justice Brennan: 'I'he
F·irst Decade," ~vard~_B.§y:ie)!, 80 {November, 1966) ,
p. 7.
3

See page 1, note 2, supra.
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factor.

It is reflected in the fact than many of Brennan's

most passionate libertarian opinions are direct reactions
to the Burger court's law-and-order stance.

lfinally, the

breakdown of ethical consensus to the extent that it "stimulated a concern with personal values"

4

may have somehow

influenced Brennan to give greater emphasis to the protection of individual liberties against governmental intrusions.

In the next three chapters, I will examine his

criminal procedure opinions.
'l.1he

Fourth £..mendment does not forbid all searches and

seizures, but only unreasonable ones.

rhus, the operative

1

word in F'ourth Amendment cases is "unreasonable."

Brennan

believes that it absolutely bans all unreasonable searches
and seizures.

He holds, furthermore, that the exclusionary

rule is part and parcel of it, and as such it bars the use
of evidence obtained through unreasonable means in court. 5
Paying strict attention to the contextual reality in each
case, he balances the individual's proposed F'ourth Amendment right against the policy reasons advanced by the government in order to ascertain whether the search in question is reasonable.
4 h' t
w i e,
5

~r t

Consistent with his liberalism, his

.
.
Law in-&Qe~,
p. 213.

~veryone does not agree with him on this point. In
fact, conservative, law-and-order Justices such as Powell
and Rehnquist believe otherwise. Valuing community stability and order, they contend that the rourth ~.mendment does
not necessarily forbid the use of illegally obtained evidence at trial.
see United~~es v. Calandra, 94 s.ct.
613 (1974) and United states...JU.......f§.ltier, 95 s.ct. 2313
(1975).
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balance gives more weight to the individual's right to privacy.

Indeed, over the years, he has tipped this scale in-

creasingly in favor of the individual.

Thus, in most cases

he has determined that the search is unreasonable, and thus
has decided in favor of the individual.
concluding that it could not prosecute Aoel, a suspected spy, the federal Bureau of Investigation informed
the Immigration and Naturalization service that he was an
illegal alien.

Upon investigation, the Service found that

he was subject to deportation, and arrested him.

Following

his arrest, the FBI, pursuant to the Hotel's permission,
searched Abel's former room and seized a hollow pencil containing a "cipher pad."

Later, Abel was brought to trial

and convicted for conspiracy to commit espionage.
motion to suppress the

~BI

rnent grounds was denied.

His

seized evidence on tourth AmendIn

~J......y-£-_Jlni~d

States (1960),

the supreme court, denied his motion and upheld his conviction.

Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, held that the

search and seizure violated the Fourth PJnendment, for it
concentrated too much power in the hands of the executive
branch.

"The progress is too easy from police action un-

scrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state,"
he wrote, "and where a species of arrest is available that
is subject to no judicial control, the possibilities become
,6
.
more an d more serious.'

Although the case was a notorious
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one involving a notorious defendant previously engaged in
espionage, he proclaimed that "the (Eourth) Amendment's
protection is made effective for everyone only by upholding
it when invoked by the worst men. 117

He contended that the

F·ourth Amendment imposed substantive standards for searches
and seizures.

Critical among these standards, he asserted,

was "independent (judicial) control over the actions of officers effecting searches of private premises. 118

He con-

eluded that the warrantless search of Pl>el's premises completely removed this independent judicial control.
At issue in ooth Elkins v. United states (1960) and
~-Y...

Oh.i2 ( 1961.) was the relationship bet1-Ween the Fourth

Amendment and the exclusionary rule.

The exclusionary rule

holds that evidence obtained through unreasonable or illegal means can not be introduced in court.

In Elkins, the

court held that evidence of a federal crime illegally
seized by state agents and turned over to federal agents on
a "silver platter" is not admissible in a federal criminal
proceeding.

The Court, however, left the door open to the

admissibility of such evidence in a state criminal proceeding.

It closed the door in

~·

Justice Tom c. Clark,

speaking for the court, declared that common sense dictated
that the exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the
7 I b'id.
8

1bid 1

I

p. 702.

,

p. 704.
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E'ourth Amendment, and that it was applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth's Due Process Clause.

Brennan

joined in t>Oth majority opinions.
The question presented in Wong_Sun v. United States
(1963) was whether verbal evidence derived from an illegal
search and seizure was admissible at trial.

Brennan,

speaking for the court, held that it was not admissible
under the Fourth Amendment.

"Verbal evidence which derives

so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized
arrest as the officers' action in the present case," he argued, "is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. 119

He further argued that "nor do the policies under-

lying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction
between physical and verbal evidence. 1110

He concluded

that since the verbal evidence was obtained through illegal
police actions, it must be excluded from court consideration.
At issue in Lowez v. United state§

(1~63)

was the ad-

missibility as evidence of an internal revenue agent's secret tape recording of a conversation between himself and
Lopez in which Lopez had offered him a bribe in connection
with a cabaret tax delinquency.
9

p. 416.

.hQnQ Sun

~_ynited States,

lOibid.._, p. 416.

The Supreme Court, speak-

83 S.Ct. 407 (1963),
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ing through Justice Harlan, held that the recording
missiole as evidence.

~as

ad-

Brennan, in a dissenting opinion,

ruled that it was inadmissible, for it violated the Fourth
Hnendment.

"In a free society," he argued, "people ought

not to have to watch their every word so carefully."

11

He

wrote, "I believe that there is a grave danger of chilling
all private, free, and unconstrained communication if secret recordings 1112 as in the present case are judged to be
admissible as evidence.

He claimed that history and the

content of the constitution pointed to the true

~ath

to the

answer of the question whether "the fruits of surreptious
electronic surveillance" fell within the Fourth Amendment's
regulatory area.
that it did.

Looking at these tactors, he concluded

He asserted that "the government ought not

to have the untrammeled right to extract evidence from
people. 1113

He contended that surreptious electronic sur-

veillance violated the "informing principles" of both the
Fourth and Fifth J.Jnendments:

"the comprehensive right of

personal liberty in the face of governmental intrusion. 1114
Police officers lost the trail of a man driving a car
llr.o,~z
v_._
.t ~
~----:..---~u~n~i-=-=e..M.....state4, 83
p. 1395.

s.ct. 1381

(1~63),

12 Ibid,, p. 1395.
13

.

.!Qid., p. 1396.

Ibid., p. 13~6. •rhese "informing principles" are
synonymous with his key notion of personal privacy and human dignity.
14
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they had observed participate in a transaction resembling
a purchase of marijuana when he made a u-turn.

Upon learn-

ing that Ker, the car's registered owner, was a known drug
offender, the officers drove to his domicile.

Gaining a

noiseless entry 15 with a key obtained from the apartment
building manager, they observed what appeared to be a package of marijuana in the kitchen and arrested Ker and his
wife for possession of narcotics in violation of the California Health and Safety Code.

In Ker v. state of Califor-

nia (1963), the Court held that under the circumstances ineluding showing that arresting officers had observed Ker, a
known drug user, contact a known marijuana dealer prior to
driving to Ker's apartment, and that marijuana was in plain
sight, which made it obvious to arresting officers, even
before they started to search, that occupants were in process of commiting felony of possession of marijuana, arrest
of occupants without warrants was valid, and the evidence
seized was constitutionally admissible.

Brennan dissented.

He declared that the unannounced intrusion violated the
Fourth i-Jllendment.

He argue<i that the :r-ourth ,t:Jnendment • s

protections of individual freedom "undoubtedly included
this

* * *

requirement of an announcement by police offi-

cers of purpose and authority before breaking into an in15 As opposed to the traditional talisman of "Open the
door in the name of the law."
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dividual's home. 1116

He further argued that "the require-

rnent is no mere procedural nicety or formality attendant
upon the service of a warrant."

17

He conceded that there

was a narrow class of exceptions:

(1) where the persons within already know of the
officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the
officers are justified in the belief that persons
within are in imminent peril or bodily harm, or (3)
where those within, made aware of the presence of
someone outside are then engaged in activity which
justifies the OLf icers in the oelief that an escape
or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.18
He concluded that this unannouced intrusion did not meet
any of the excepting criteria.

f·urthermore, he contended

that the practical hazards of "mistaken identity" or of the
"officers' dangerous calling" militated against expanding
the number of exceptions.
whereas Brennan condemned the police officers' intrusion in

~,

he sanctioned their actions in the cases of

~~ber_y..s.,...J;.aJ:ifornia

(1966) and Hgx.Q§ll.L Maryland Peni-

ten,ti.ary v. Hayden (1967), for the warrantless searches in
both met his excepting criteria of "ensuring the safety of
arresting officers and the security of the arrest against
the prisoner's {or evidence's) escape."

.Moreover, these

cases reflect his "willingness to concede the legitimate

16
~ v. state of California, 83 s.ct. 1623 (1963),
p. 1637.
17

..ll2iQi, p. 1637.

18
1bidL1 P• 1636.
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needs of the police as protectors of the social order.
In

~hrnerber,

1119

.
Brennan, joined
by the four conserva t 'ives, 20

held that the taking of schrnerber's blood, pursuant to a

police officer's request, at the hospital against his will
for the express purpose of determining whether he had been
driving while intoxicated following an accident in which
he had sustained injuries did not violate his right under
the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonaole searches
and seizures.
of the

~ourth

He contended that "the overriding function
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and

dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. 1121
22
Given the special facts of the case,
he argued that "the
attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol-content

* * *

was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest 1123 for
drunken driving.

Citing the number of traffic fatalities
due to drunken drivers, 24 he proclaimed that the state had

19

Heck, pp. 866-867.

20
Justices Torn c. Clark, Byron R. White, Potter
Stewart, and John Marshall Harlan.
21c~"h"'
b
.,,,.1 ; f
.
,
~~~Y.t.~~ ornia, 86 s.ct. 1826 (1966), p.

1834.
Indeed, one of the central notions of Brennan's liberalism is this protection of personal privacy and human
dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state. 'l'his
notion carries over to his approach in Bill of Rights
cases.
22 1
. l ar, t h e facts that the blood was withn particu
drawn in a hosptial by a doctor and that alcohol absorbed
in the blood quickly dissipates.
23

24

Ibi~, p. 1836.

For Brennan this alarming number justified shifting
the balance in favor of governmental intrusion.
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a legitimate interest in keeping them off the roads.

He

claimed that "there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an
automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 1125

He cautioned, however, that the holding was limit-

ed only to the facts of the present case.
This opinion certainly is not a libertarian one.

In

fact, Brennan's liberal 8rethen warren, Black, DOuglas, and
Fortas dissented from it.

But it is a pragmatic one.

This

fact answers the question why Brennan, the liberal, took
such a conservative stance.

He was alarmed by the number

of needless traffic fatalities due to drunk drivers.

con-

sequently, he subtly balanced away schmerber's right to
privacy--the taking of one's blood against his will clearly cuts to the heart of privacy--in favor of the safety of
society's highways.

Edward

v.

Heck wrote:

"convinced that

society's interest in protection from drunken drivers required limited restriction on individual liberty, Brennan
did indeed engage in a 'refined, subtle reasoning and balancing process. 11126

Also, the concept of "ordered liberty"

is reflected in the opinion.

consistent with the label of

"pragmatic liberalism," Brennan wrote, "without 'order'
25
26

Sch~~.

p. 1645.

Heck, p. 868.

schmerber was visibly drunk.
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. . . ..,,,.rty. ' 1127
there i. s no 'li' -~

I n thi' s case, o r der i· s ne c es sa ry

to insure the safety of the highways and the greatest liberty of all:

life itself.

H9.yden had its origin in police officers' entrance
into a house and

s~arch

and seizure therein without a war-

rant of clothing--a cap, jacket, and pants--matching description of those worn by an armed robber who police had
trailed there in "hot pursuit."

Considering the circum-

stances of the case, 28 Brennan, joined once again by the
four conservatives, 29 held that the warrantless search and
seizure ¥Jas reasonable.

He contended that "the Fourth

r:.mendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. 1130

He concluded

that "'the exigencies of the situation made the course imperative. •1131

He wrote:

Speed here was essential, and only a thorough
search of the house for persons and weapons could
have insured that Hayden was the only man present
27

william J. Brennan, Jr., "Ordered Liberty: ·rhe
Beginning Lawyer's Challenge," ~lich~tat~~Q.Y~,
42 {April, 1963), p. 14.
28 1

. l ar, t h e f act t h at t h e searc h and seizure
.
n particu
was incident to a "hot pursuit."
29

.

Justices Black, Warren, and Fortas concurred, while
Douglas dissented.
30

~en.

M~~and P~enti~r~

1642 (1967), p. 1646.
31 I b'd
i,

'

P• 1645.

v.

H~n.

87 s.ct.
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and that the police had control of all weapons
which could be used against them or to effect an
escape.32
In United st.a..tes_y...___Qionisio (1973), the supreme
court, through Justice Stewart, held that a grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to appear before it and directing him to provide a voice exemplar did not violate his
Fourth Amendment rights.

In a dissenting opinion, Brennan

agreed with the majority "that no unreasonable seizure of
the rourth Amendment is effected by a grand jury subpoena
limited to requiring the appearance of a suspect to testif

y. ,.33

He argued, however, that a grand jury subpoena re-

quiring a suspect's appearance for the reason of obtaining
voice or handwriting exemplars from him was a completely
different matter.

He concluded that "the reasonaoleness

under the :t·ourth Amendment of such a seizure cannot be
simply presumed."

34

while on routine patrol, a police officer stopped a
car when he observed that a headlight and its license plate
light were burned out.
the car.

Bustamonte was one ot six men in

'when, in response to the ot f icer • s request, no

one could produce any evidence of identification, except
one Alcala, brother ot the car's owner but not the driver,
32
33

1bid., p. 1646.
united States v.._Dion1:siQ, 93 S.Ct. 764 (1973).

p. 776.
34Th;d
~
~..!LI p. 776.
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the officer asked them to step out of the car.

Upon the

arrival of two additional officers, the original one asked
i:t they could search it.
fered to help with it.

Alcala consented; indeed, he ofThe ofticers found three checks,

stolen from a car wash, wadded up under the left rear seat.
On the basis of this and other evidence, Bustamente was
charged with possession of completed checks with intent to
defraud.

At trial he unsuccessfully moved to have the

checks suppressed as evidence.

In scbneckloth y. Busta-

monte (1973), the supreme court upheld his conviction on
the ground that consent may De voluntary even though the
consenter did not know that he had a constitutional right
to refuse to allow the search.

Brennan dissented.

He cas-

tigated the Burger court majority's conclusion that the
prosecution is not required to demonstrate the defendant's
knowledge of his right to refuse as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent to the warrantless search of
his automobile.

He declared that its conclusion "is sup-

ported neither by 'linquistics,' nor by 'epistemology,'
nor, indeed, by 'comrr.onssnse.• 1135

He proclaimed tnat "it

wholly escapes rr.e how our citizens can meaningfully oe said
to have waived something as precious as a constitutional
guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. 1136
35

p. 2073.
36

~hneckloth

v. Bustamente, 93 s.ct. 2041 (1973),

1b~, p. 2073.
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He argued that a third party, in this case Alcala, can not
waive an individual's constitutional right to be secure
against an unwarranted search of an automobile.

The facts

that no search warrant was obtained, and that the police
officers as representatives of the state did not even suggest a probable cause 37 to search the vehicle or that the
search was incident to a valid arrest of the car's occupants only added to his disbelief and shock with the court
majority's conclusion.

In short, he concluded that the

search was a constitutionally prohibited invasion of privacy.
Beginning in 1971, the Burger court's law-and-order
justices began their assault on the libertarian conception
ot the 1'ourth J..mendment's exclusionary rule.

38

Brennan

consistently has criticized this assault as an insult to
the adjudicatory function, and the institutional integrity
of the court.

Moreover, he has clung to the

~arren

court!s

view, parts of which were painted by opinions authored oy
him, that the exclusionary rule is a necessary and inherent
constitutional ingredient of the Fourth 1-'Jnendrnent.

He reg-

istered his complaint in both 11.nited States v. Calandra
37

Reflecting his liberalism, Brennan's standard with
respect to probaole cause is a high one. conversely, Justices Powell and Rehnquist use a lower standard.
38
chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens
:i..L-.Six_JJ.nknown AQfillil--2.f~~ral By~au ot N,ll~ilg, 91 s.
ct. 1999 (1971), commenced this assault.
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(1974) and

~ed

statea

~eltier

(1975).

In

Calandr~,

Powell, speaking for the Court, held that a witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based
on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure.
Brennan, in a passionate dissenting opinion, argued that
the majority's opinion vitiated the exclusionary rule.

39

"This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a determination whether its application furthers deterrence of future
police misconduct," he wrote, "reflects a startling misconception ot the historical objective and purposes of the
rule. 1140

He disagreed wholeheartedly with the Court's as-

39 wh et h er Brennan is
. rig
. h t or wrong on t h"is point
.
d epends largely upon what side of the fence one is sitting
on.
It can be argued convincingly, however, that reducing
the exclusionary rule only to its deterrent role waters
do-wn the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment to an inexcusable level.
In short, the Burger court is extracting the
"teeth out of the guarantee." see Jeffrey .rv1. Bain and
Michael K. Kelly, "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree:
Recent oevolopments As Viewed Through its Exceptions, University of
Mi.am.L.k.a~xli~, 31 (spring, 1977), pp. 615-650; ~1ichael
Billy, Jr., and Gordon A. Rehnborg, Jr., "The rourth Amendment E.xclusionary Rule:
Past, Present, No Future, II rl1he
l:W:l~~n..JJimill.Q!_Law Review, 12 (winter, 1~75), pp. 507537; John M. Burkoff, "'.Che Court That Devoured the ~-,ourth
Amendment: '£he ·rriumph of an Inconsistent E.xclusionary
Doctrine," Or~n Law~ti~, 58 (1979), pp. 151-1::12;
Bernard J. Gilday, Jr., "The Exclusionary Rule:
Do-wn and
Almost Out," l'iQxthern isen.:t.Ycky Law Revie-w, 4 (1977), pp. 119; Keith Allan Glover, "'I'he Exlusionary Rule, Standing,
and :t.xpectation of Privacy For Car Passengers:
A confusion
of Concepts," Ba~lOLl:!.a_w Beyiew, 31 (Spring, 1979) , pp.
227-241; and Robert s. Iron, "The Burger court: Discord in
search and seizure," .Yn.!.Yersity of Rich!!lQ.Ild L.QH_~vie~, 8
(Spring, 1~74), pp. 433-455.
11

40 . d
lln!.t!i.Q~.k§§....V. Calandra, 94 S.Ct. 613 {1974),
p. 624.

~8

~ertion

that the exclusionary rule was rr.erely a judically

created remedy designed to safeguard rourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent ettect.

Rather,

he wrote:
~he exclusionary rule is 'part and parcel o:t the
:tourth Arr.endment's limitation upon (governrr.ental)
encroachment o:t individual privacy,• and 'an essential part of both the l''ourth and r·ourteenth
Amendments,• that 'gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him,
to the police o:tticers no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in
the true administration o:t justice.41

Dissenting in

Pelt~,

he vehemently objected to the

court's "slow strangulation" of the exclusionary rule as
part and parcel of the l'ourth Amendment.

He argued that

the court's new formulation was fraught with uncertainty.
He wrote:
An analysis of the Court's unsuccessfully veiled
reformulation demonstrates that its apparent rush
to discard 61 years ot constitutional development
has produced a formula difficult to comprehend
and, on any understanding ot its meaning, impossible to justify.42

furthermore, he protested strongly against the court's adding a new layer of facttinding.

Previously, the decision

to exclude evidence had turned upon whether it was in :tact
illegally obtained.

Justice Kehnquist's decision, however,

expanded the inquiry to included whether the law enforcement
41

,t:).

~lan~~. pp. 625-626.

42 United
.
.
States v. Pe 1 tier,
2325.

~5

s.ct. 2313 ( 1~75 )

I

99

officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged ¥Jith
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
.Fourth Amendment.

Reflecting his earlier interest in court

reform, he asserted that the court's new formulation invalving consideration of the subjective state of mind of
numerous people only added to the lower courts' already
overcrowded dockets.
After an investigation by the state's

~ttorney's

fraud unit of real estate settlement activities in certain
t•.aryland counties indicated that one Mdresen, while acting as a settlement attorney, had defrauded the purchaser
of certain realty (Lot 13T), the investigators obtained
¥Jarrants to search petitioner's offices.

The ¥Jarrants

listed specified items pertaining to Lot 13T to be seized
"together with other fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime at this (time) unknown."

In the ensuing

search a number of incriminating documents, including some
containing statements made by Andresen were seized.
.Andresen

l!.&._1:.i~.!_gng

In

(1976), the supreme court, through

Justice Blackmun, implicitly denied Andresen's motion to
suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the general warrants. 43
43

Claiming that "general warrants are specifically

Blackmun concentrated on the defendant's claim to
the l:iiftn P..mendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination (see pp. 117-118), and did not directly address the ~·ourth Amendment one.
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prohibited by the :t·ourth Amendment, 1144 Brennan dissented.
He wrote, "the problem to be avoided is 'not that of intrusion per se, but of a general exploratory rurrunaging in a
person's belongings. 1145

He thus declared that the Fourth

Amendment's end of protecting '"the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life'" clearly required that "a
warrant specify with particularity the place to be searched
46
.
.
and th e t h ings
to b e seized."

He concluded unequivocally

that the warrants in question were indeed general, and as
such unconstitutional.
United Statea

~~.D.§

(1980) originated from the

use of illegally seized evidence to impeach statements made
by the defendant on cross-examination.
the use of such evidence.

The Court upheld

Brennan dissented.

He declared

that such a use of unlawfully seized evidence violated the
E'ourth Amendment.

He contended that "arriving at the truth

is a fundamental goal of our legal system. 1147

He argued,

however, that it was a goal that could not be realized
through illegal police conduct.

He wrote, "the processes

of our judicial system may not be fueled by the illegali44

Andresen v. Maryla.n.Q,

45

.IP~.

46

Ibi~, p.

96 s.ct. 2737 (1976) p. 2754.

p. 2754.
·2754.

47 lln._~~~x.
. t.o!:'>.~
Havens, 100 S.Ct. 1912 (1980),
p. 1920.

101
.
h
. .
..48
ties of government aut orities.

He found the Court's

treatment of Fourth and Fifth Amendment privileges disturbing.

"The court denigrates their unique status as consti-

tutional protectors," he claimed,

11

.by treating (these)

. ·1 eges as mere incen
.
t.ive sc h emes. .. 49
privi

He charged that

the court's decision "patently" disregarded its obligation
and res90nsibility to enforce constitutional guarantees.
In

~~ork

v. BeJ.£.Qn (1981), the supreme court ruled

that a police officer's warrantless search of an automobile
immediately subsequent to the driver's custodial arrest was
reasonable as a contemporaneous incident to the arrest.
Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, argued that "it has long
been a fundamental principle of .t'ourth j.Jllendment analysis
that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to oe narrawly construed."
ment's essential

50

He contended that the rourth Amend-

~urpose

carried with it two corollaries:

First, for a search to be valid under the Eourth
Amendment, it must be 'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'
~econd, in determining
whether to grant an exception to the warrant requirement, Courts should carefully consider the
facts and circumstances of each search and seizure,
focusing on the reasons supporting the exception
rather than on any bright line rule of general
application.51

2886.

48

Ibi~, p. 1920.

49

.
l.Qid., p. 1920.

SO~

York

v~elton,

SlI-01'd . , p. 2866.

101 s.ct. 2860 (1981), p.
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Against these corollaries,_he concluded that the search in
the present case was invalid.
In

~ourth

Amendment cases, Brennan balances the indi-

vidual's claim against the proposed governmental interest
to determine reasonableness ot the search.

Valuing the

protection ot individual privacy and dignity against intrusion by the State, he usually has found that the search is
unreasonable or unwarranted: and, thus, he has decided in
favor of the individual.
since

1~6~,

automatic.

over the years, particularly

this decision has become increasingly, almost
In fact, of the thirteen cases examined, he

ruled in favor the reasonableness ot the government's
search only twice.

In both Schrnerber and

Hg~,

he tound

the searches reasonable because the circumstances surrounding them implicated his excepting criteria of "ensuring the safety of the arresting of ticers and the security
of the arrest against the suspect's or evidence's escape."
In other words, both are classified as "Emergency
Searches. 1152
52

Peter

w.

Lewis, CriminaLPrQ.£edure: I.bL,S,y..f?~~
(st. Paul: west Publishing co., 197~),

~urt's View~ases

pp. 195-201.

CHAPTER VIII
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The :E'ifth Amendment encompasses the double jeopardy
clause, the compelled self-incrimination clause, the due
process clause, and the .. taking" clause.
deal with criminal procedure. 1

'I1he first three

Brennan has exhioited both

a passionate concern for the rights of persons accused of
crimes and an absolute intolerance for police misconduct
in the course of a criminal investigation.

:t·or him, it is

better to let ninety-nine guilty men go free than to convict one innocent man.

Daniel M. Berman wrote, "the pos-

sinility of convicting an innocent man (tor Brennan) is tar
more frightening than the chance that a scrupulous regard
for the constitutional rights of defendants may result in
allowing some criminal to escape punishment.lt 2

He does not

see any gray in the area ot these three ri:tth t-..mendrnent
guarantees.

·rhus, in cases involving them, he has employ-

ed an absolutist approach.
1

The due process clause, of course, sweeps more
broadly than just criminal procedure.
It deals also with
substantive rights.
2

oaniel ~•• Berman, "Mr. Justice Brennan: A Preliminary Appraisal, 11 The catholic Universi!;y_1&,W Review, 7
(January, 1~58), p. 15.
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During the anti-communist crusade, one Nrs. Brown, a
defendant in denaturalization proceedings, was convicted of
criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions on
cross-examination of her voluntary testimony about her past
and present aftiliation with the American communist Party.
In

~rown,~

United

Stat~

{1~58),

the Supreme Court held

that Mrs. Brown could not invoke the privilege against compelled self-incrimination on cross-examination regarding
matters made relevant by her direct examination because she
had taken the stand voluntarily to testify in her own behalf.

In a dissenting opinion, Brennan argued that the

sentence was "far too drastic" considering the other available sanctions.

He concluded that the trial judge's exclu-

sive reliance upon the criminal contempt power was arbitrary in the circumstances, and, therefore violated

~lrs.

Brown's right to due process of law.
The issue of double jeopardy arose in Abbate vL
.unit~

states

{195~).

The defendants were convicted in a

Illinois state court of conspiring to destroy property of
telephone companies.

Brennan, speaking for the court, held

that the subsequent federal prosecution did not violate the
Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause.

Drawing upon a

huge body of precedent, 3 he concluded that "from the nature
3

Brennan drew upon this body of precedent, while his
libertarian warren court Brethen Warren, Black, and Douglas
did not~ thereby, accounting, in part, for their dissent.
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of our government, the same act may be an offence against
the laws of the United states and also of a state, and be
punishable in both. 114

The dual sovereignty of the American

government--E·ederal and State-was the decisive factor in
his decision.

Moreover, he suggested that a contrary hold-

ing might jeopardize an important federal interest in situations in which the federal sanction was far more severe
than the penalty imposed by the State.
Throughout his years on the court, Brennan has remained consistent to this view that the double jeopardy
clause is not applicable in cases involving dual sovereignty.

As will be shown in later cases, however, he believes

that it can be invoked in cases involving successive prosecutions in the same state or sovereignty for the same offence.

In short, the issue of sovereignty is a dividing

line for his approach in double jeopardy cases.
Jencks, a labor-union officer, was charged with
falsely swearing that he was not, on a specified date, affiliated with the communist Party.

The Government called

as its principle witnesses two Party members who were also
federal agents, and who made reports to the r·ederal Bureau
of Investigation on Jencks' activities about which they
testified.

At trial, Jencks unsuccessfully moved that the

Government produce these reports for the judge's inspection
4
Abbate v. United st~, 79 s.ct. 666 (1959), pp.
669-670.
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and, if any discrepancy appeared between theffi and the testimony of their authors, that they be turned over to him
for use in cross-examination.

In

~ncks_~nited

States

(1957), the supreme court, through Brennan, held that a
prior showing of inconsistency was unnecessary and that the
reports must be given directly to the defendant without any
prior screening by the judge.

He argued that Jencks was

entitled to a court order directing the government to produce the reports.

He asserted that the adequacy of Jencks'

defense was contingent on his accessibility to them.
deed, he proclaimed that "justice requires no less."
Lerner

y_,_~~Y

In5

(1958) originated from the state of

New York's dismissal of an employee of its Transit system
under a Security Risk Law, on the basis that he had been
disclosed to be of doubtful trust and reliability by his
failure to answer a question concerning his present relationship to the Communist Party.

Considering the facts,

the Court declared that the dismissal was justifiable under
the Security Risk Law, and was not rendered unconstitutional by Lerner's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination.

In a dissenting

opinion, Brennan contended that the court failed to grasp
the right at stake.

His concern arose from "the simultane-

ous public labeling of the employee as disloyal. 116
5

1103.
6

He

~&.1~ Uniteg~~. 77 s.ct. 1077 (1957), p.
~Ji.L.~

case~,

78 s.ct. 1311 (1958), p. 1328.
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concluded that the dismissal should be reversed, for it
branded him a disloyal American without due process of law.
He wrote:
strict adherence to required legal procedures,
especially where one's loyalty is being impugned,
affords the greatest and, in last analysis, the
ultimate assurance of the inviolability of our
freedoms as we have heretofore known them in this
country. Least of all, should they be impaired
or trenched upon by procedural shortcuts.7
The anti-communist crusade led to the adoption of an
assortment of security and loyalty measures by the federal
government and the states aimed at guarding against the
danger of an internal Communist conspiracy.

One of these

measures was the Subversive Activities control Act of 1950.
In the Act, Congress found that "there exists an world communist movement

* * *

whose purpose it is, by treachery,

. ., espionage,

deceit, infiltration.

sabotage, terrorism,

and any other means deemed necessary, to establish a communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world. • • "

rrhe Act, therefore, required that

"Communist-action organizations" in the United States register with the Attorney General and file membership lists
and other information, or face heavy criminal penalties.
It created also the Subversive Activities Control Board and
authorized it, upon petition by the Attorney General, to
determine whether a named group is a .. communist-action
7 Ibid., p. 1329.
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organization" and to order such an organization to register in accordance with the Act.

conversely, while it re-

quired "Communist-action groups" to register, the sedition
sections of the smith Act (1940) created a prima facie case
that membership in the Communist Party was a federal offence.
of

This conflict was presented in both communi§t

the_JJni,t§.Q__~~JL.XL_Subversive

~g

(1961) and A1bertson v.

~.ill:Q

(1965).
11he

f~

AKtJJlities Control

sub~.:§ive

Activities control

question posed in the former case was whether the

registration requirements of the subversive Activities control Act violated the Eifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination.

Justice Felix !frankfurter, in one of

the longest opinions of supreme court history, spoke for
the majority.

He held that the public interest in disclo-

sure outweighed the private right of free expression.

With

respect to the 1-ifth Amendment question, he declared that
compulsory registration did not constitute compelled selfincrimination, for it required only the Party to register,
not individual members.

Brennan, in a dissenting opinion,

concluded that it was a prime example of forced self-incrimination, and as such violated the 1:·ifth Amendment.

He

wrote, "I believe that the officials cannot be compelled to
complete, sign and file the registration statement without
abriqging their privilege against (compulsory) self-incrim-
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nation." 8

"Registration is unique," he wrote, "because of

the initial burden it puts on the potential defendant to
come forward and claim the privilege. 119

He further argued

that by registrating, the officials virtually established
a prirna facie case against themselves, for by so doing,
they admitted an element of their possible criminality of
belonging to the communist Party in violation of the smith
Act's membership clause.
The Subversive Activities control Board's order requiring petitioners to register individually their membership in the United states' Communist Party gave birth to
lb +-a-~
A:Y;J§.X~·

•
Brennan, speak'ing f or an unanimous
cour t , 10

held that the orders requiring Albertson to register were
inconsistent with the self-incrimination clause.
~muni§t

As in

Party, he believed that the risks of incrimina-

tion imposed by the registration orders were obvious.

He

wrote, "such an admission of membership may be used to
prosecute the registrant under the membership clause of the
Smith Act. 1111
8
~trol

9

communis.t__.far.tlL.Q1-t.bg_llnited sta.t.§s y.
Board, 81 s.ct. 1357 (1~61), p. 1464.

subve~~

Ibid., p. 1462.

lOTh e maJori
'
' t y in
' ~mmY~
~; a+- Rar t y JOine
' .
d t h e d issent.
ers. The distinction for Stewart, Clark, and Harlan
(Frankfurter and Whittaker retired in 1962) between the two
cases was that the former required organizations, not individuals, to register, while the latter required individuals to do so.

~bertson y, ~ersiv~~ivities Control Board,
86 s.ct. 194 (1g6S), p. 198.
11

·I'
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In schmerber (1966), 12 Brennan held also that the
taking of plaintiff's blood over his protest on advice of
counsel did not violate his F'ifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination.

Indeed, he claimed

that this action did not even implicate the privilege.

He

argued that history and legal precedent 13 limited the privilege's area of protection to those circumstances involving
the state's obtaining of evidence "against an accused
through 'the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
his own mouth. 11114

He wrote, "the privilege protects an

accused only from being compelled to testify against himself or otherwise provide the state with evidence ot a testimonial or communicative nature. 1115

Conversely, he argued

that "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate
it. 1116

In fact, this distinction between "testimonial or

communicative evidence" and "real or physical evidence" is
the basis of his opinion.

He concluded that the withdrawl

of blood and use of the analysis was the latter form of
evidence, and as such not inadmissible under the self-in12
13

See pp. 90-93.

warren, Black, Douglas, and E·ortas apparently did
not afford history and legal precedent the same degree of
respect as Brennan in this case.
14
Schmerber, p. 1831.
15
Ibid., P• 1830.
16
Ibid., P• 1830.
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crimination clause.
'I'his distinction between types of evidence, moreover,
is a dividing line tor him in self-incrimination cases.

If

the compelled evidence is "real or physical," he relies
upon the "shock the conscience" test.

Consistent with his

libertarianisrr., his conscience is shocked rather easily.
It was not shocked in

SchnJ~rbex,

however, because the blood

sample was taken in a hospital by a doctor in accordance
with humane medical practices.

But, one can strongly in-

ter that such would not be the case it the circumstances
dittered even in the slightest degree.

In fact, Brennan

cautioned in Schmerber that the holding was limited only to
the tacts at hand.

Conversely, he believes that the

~ifth

Amendment's self-incrimination clause absolutely prohibits
the compelling ot
In the

1~6~

11

testin1onial or corr.municative" evidence.

Term, the supreme court, using the "same

evidence" test, upheld plaintiff's plea vis-a-vis the titth
J~endment's

(1~70)

Double Jeopardy Clause in waller v. 1'lorida

and Ashe v.

~wenson

(1~70).

Brennan concurred in

both cases because he objected to the majority's use of
the "same evidence" test rather than the "same transactionn
one.
~aller

In liJ:le.:, a :tlorida municipal court convicted one
for violating a city ordinance against destruction

of city property and breach of the peace, and sentenced
him to six-months in jail.

Shortly thereafter, a state

court tried, convicted, and sentenced him to six-

112

years tor grand larceny, a charge concededly based on the
same evidence as was involved in the municipal case.

In

his concurring opinion, Brennan disposed of the case by
statin9, consistent with Abbate, that successive prosecutions by one sovereign judicial entity violated the Double
Jeopardy clause.

He believes that municipal and state

courts are part of one sovereign judicial system.
Ashe had its origin in the armed robbery by three or
four men of six poker players in the home of one of the
victims.

After being charged in separate courts with rob-

bery of each of the six players, the defendant was acquitted for robbing one of the players in one court for insutticient evidence.

Nonetheless, he still faced five more

trials tor the robbery of each of the five remaining playera.

Brennan, in his concurrence, expanded upon his

~ler

opinion and called tor the adoption of the "same transaction" test over the "same evidence" test.

He wrote, "the

Double Jeopardy Clause requires in prosecution, except in
limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges
against a defendant that grow out of a single transac..17
.
t ion.
He contended that the feared abuses of the crirninal process may be most effectively avoided by adopting
the "same transaction" test.

He argued that the test pro-

tected the individual best against the "possible tyranny of
17

A§be v. swensQ.n, 90 s.ct. 1189 (1970), p. 1199.
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the overzealous prosecutor."

18

Finally, he proclaimed that

the test
not only enforces the ancient prohibition
against vexatious multiple prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, but responds
as well to the increasingly widespread recognition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of
all issues arising out of a single transaction
or occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and
convenience.19
Conversely, he expressed a real uneasiness with respect to
the "same evidence" test.

"The constitutional protection

against double jeopardy is empty of meaning," he wrote, "if
the defendant is forced to 'run the gauntlet' as many times
as there are victims of a single episode. 1120

Relying upon

the "same transaction" test, he declared that subsequent
trials for the same offence following the defendant's acquittal placed him in double jeopardy.
~rn~~ Arizona (1966) 21 stood as the warren
court's shrine safeguarding criminal suspects against the
forced disclosure of evidence.

Chief Justice Warren de-

clared that the privilege against self-incrimination attaches itself at the point an individual is taken into cus18T"h;~

~..S.I

19

p. 1201.

Ibid., p. 1199.

2 0ibid,, p. 1202.
21

~anda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966),
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tody, and positive safeguards must be employed to protect
it. 22

According to him, these safeguards included inform-

ing a suspect undergoing interrogation that he had the
right to remain silent, that anything he might say could
be. used against him, and that he was entitled to counsel
during such pretrial interrogation.
viction of

~iranda,

He overturned the con-

and three others on the ground that the

safeguards protecting the privilege against self-incrimination were not met.

Brennan joined wholeheartedly in

warren's majority opinion.

Indeed, in an earlier case, he

wrote:
(T)he American system of criminal prosecution
is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and the Eifth
Amendment privilege (against self-incrimination)
is its essential mainstay. Governments, state and
federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and not by coercion prove a charge
against an accused out of his own mouth.23
In

1~71,

however, the Burger court's law-and-order

Justices began to undermine the authority of the tviiranda
safeguards.

22

In

~i.:i.§

v.

NelL.~

(1971), the Court held

This certainly is in line with Leonard Levy's examination of the origins of the F·ifth Amendment• s self-incrimination clause in .Q.l:..i.gins ot._the Fit.th bme~~ (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1968). considering the
fact that the clause was inserted in the Fifth Amendment,
not the Sixth, led Levy to argue that the i:·ramers clearly
intended that the privilege against self-incrimination extended to all phases of the criminal proceeding, not just
only to the actual trial. Brennan's conception of the
privilege's scope is in accord with Levy's argument.
23
li9llo~~2.9.9.D· 84 s.ct. 1489 (1964), p. 1493.
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that a pretrial confession obtained without Mixan.d.9 safeguards could probably be used to impeach the defendant's
trial testimony.

Brennan, in a passionate and angry dis-

senting opinion, declared that the court's decision was
"monstrous," for it went "far toward undoing much of the
progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitution. 1124

He argued that "the essential mainstay of (our

adversary) system is the privilege against self-incrimination. "25

He concluded that the court's opinion threatened

to undercut it, thereby threatening the integrity of the
entire system.
CalifQ.l.Dia._y, Byers (1971) grew out of the defendant's prosecution for refusing to comply with a California
statute which required those involved in an automobile accident resulting in property damage to stop and give their
names and addresses, and which provided no inununity from
use in subsequent criminal prosecutions of information obtained by the state as a consequence of compliance with the
statute.

The Supreme court ruled that the statute did not

violate individual's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,

Brennan dissented.

He argued that "the stat-

ute requires an individual to admit that he has engaged in
conduct likely to be the subject of criminal punishment
24U.:::i....-...-'
k
~.1_s__
v_.-s.1N~e~w-..:YQXJS, 91 S,Ct. 643 (1971), p. 649.

25

Ibid., p. 649.

116
under the California traffic law. 1126

l:.choing the Califor-

nia supreme court's decision, he contended that the requirement may be enforced consistent with the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, only if those reporting their involvement were made immune from prosecution
of of fence related to accident.
In ,fRul v. Dayis (1976), the court held that a flyer
which was distributed among merchants by the police containing Paul's name and photograph captioned "Active
Shoplifters" did not violate his right to due process of
law.

Brennan, in a vehemently worded dissent, declared

that the flyer clearly violated the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause.

He wrote:

I have always thought that one of this court's
most important roles is to provide a bulwark
against governmental violations of the constitutional safeguards securing in our free society
the legitimate expectations of every person to
innate human dignity and sense of worth.27
He charged that the majority's opinion constituted a "regretable" abdication of this role, and "a saddening denigration of our majestic Bill of Rights. 1128

He contended

that it validated the imposition by the police on Paul of
"the stigmatizing label of 'criminal' without the salutary
and constitutionally mandated safeguards of a criminal
26

califQlalia y, Byers,

27p
28

au

l

.
y. navi§,
96

1121Q~, p. 1177.

~1 s.ct. 1535 (1971), p. 1563.

s.ct.

1155 (1976), p. 1177.
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trial. 1129

.. Certainly the enjoyment of one's good name and

reputation," he proclaimed, was "among the most cherished
of rights enjoyed by a free people. 1130

~1oreover, he claim-

ed that the Court's decision undermined the presumption of
innocence.
During the 1975 Term, the supreme court considered
the issue of self-incrimination and the compelled production of business papers in the separate cases of .[.!sher v.

f.iJlb~,

the Government commenced enforcement actions in two

cases to compel production of accountants' documents in
possession of taxpayers' attorneys.

In eacn 01: these cases

taxpayers, who were under investigation for possible civil
or criminal liability under the federal income tax laws,
after having obtained from their respective accountants
certain documents relating to the accountants' preparation
of their tax returns, transfered the documents to their respective attorneys to assist the taxpayers in connection
with the investigation.

subsequently, the Internal Revenue

service served summonses on the attorney's directing them
to produce the documents, but the attorneys refused to comply on the ground that the documents served to self-incriminate their respective clients.

'I he Supreme Court held
1

that the compelled production of the documents did not vio-

29

Ibid., p. 1168.

JOibid,, p. 1171.
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late the self-incrimination clause, for taxpayers have no
Fifth Amendment privilege to withhold such documents.
Brennan wrote a concurring opinion because the majority
neglected to stress the fact that the accountants' documents in question were not private papers or effects.
joined nonetheless in the result.

He

He asserted that "the

protection of personal privacy is a central purpose of the
privilege (against self-incrimination)." 31

He contended

that the historically recognized zone of privacy protected
by the Fifth J.\mendment extended to all personal papers and
effects.

He stated that business records, except those of

sole proprietors and practitioners, 32 generally fall outside that zone of privacy.

Considering the facts that the

accountants• work papers in question did not relate to the
preparation of their personal tax returns, and that the
papers were wholly business in nature (i.e., pursuant to
the selling of their public services), Brennan concluded
that they were public, not private papers and effects.
Thus, he held that they fell outside the Fifth Amendment's
zone of privacy.
On the other hand, &idresen involved the business
papers of a sole proprietor and practitioner. 33
31
1583.

The Court,

Fisher y. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976), p.

32

ae cited the fact that the court previously had
recognized that the self-incrimination privilege extended
to this category of business papers.
33
see p. 99 for facts of case.
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nonetheless, held that the introduction at trail of petitioner's personal business documents, including some containing statements made by him, did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination.
Brennan dissented.
t.i.§.b~,

~ocusing

without any hesitation,

on the exception expressed in

he claimed that personal business papers (i.e.,

those of a sole proprietor and practitioner) fell inside
the Fifth Amendment's zone of privacy.

He thus held that

the introduction of such papers, as in the present case,
clearly violated the self-incrimination clause.
Speaking for the Court in United
~n_~Jilly comp~

S.t.,a:t.~.

Martin

(1977), Brennan proclaimed that the

double jeopardy clause barred an appeal by the Government
of the United states of a judgment of acquittal following
the discharge of a jury which had been unable to agree on
a verdict in a criminal contempt trial.

since congress had

removed the statutory limitations to appeal, he claimed the
relevant inquiry turns on the reach of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.

Indeed, he wrote, "it has become 'necessary to

take a closer look at the policies underlying the clause in
order to determine more precisely the boundaries of the
Government's appeal rights in criminal

cases. 113 ~

He argued

that the DOuble Jeopardy Clause
3

~l.lnited_States v. Martin Linen_~upply Company, ~7
ct. 1349 (1977), p. 1353.

s.
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guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict the accused 'thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in
a continuous state of anxiety and insecurity.35
The protections afforded by the Clause, he contended, do
not come into play unless the accused has been placed in
jeopardy.

"This state of jeopardy attaches," he wrote,

"when the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial
36
when the judge begins to receive evidence."
He concluded
that the state of jeopardy had been attached when the jury
was empaneled.
In United states y, DiFrancesco (1980), the court
ruled that the United states may appeal. a sentence imposed
by a federal district judge on the ground that it was too
lenient.

In a dissenting.opinion, Brennan declared that

the United states may not appeal the sentence, for it violated the double jeopardy clause.

He adhered to one view

that the United states may not appeal an acquittal.

That

the Court showed no basis for differentiating between the
finality of acquittals and the finality of sentences rated
heavily in his decision._

.Moreover, he warned against

allowing the government to enhance a sentence because he
believed that it opened the door to the government appeal
of acquittals.
35

Ib~, p. 1353.

36

Ibid~, p. 1354.
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Brennan's rifth Amendment decisions with respect to
the double jeopardy, the compelled self-incrimination, and
due process clauses reflect his determination to safeguard
the rights o:f: the accused.

Unlike in E·irst and fourth

Amendment cases, Brennan does not employ a balancing test
in

r if th

j;Inendment cases.

solutist approach.

Rather, he has employed an ab-

He believes that there are no legiti-

mate governmental reasons for circumventing the privileges
secured by the :tifth .Amendment.

Eor him, consistent with

his libertarianism, the parameters of the privileges secured by the Fifth

~~endrnent

are wide.

The critical ques-

tion for his approach is whether the privilege attaches.
In

Schme~ber

and

Fis~,

he held that the compulsory draw-

ing of a man's blood, who had been involved in an automobile accident, for purposes of determining his bloodalcohol-content, and the compelled production ot papers ot
a wholly business nature did not implicate the privilege
against self-incrimination.

In

Abba~,

he declared that

the successive prosecutions for the same offence in different sovereignties did not implicate the double jeopardy
clause.

In the vast majority of cases, however, he has

ruled that the privilege attaches.

In all these cases, he

has afforded the individual's privilege absolute protection.

CHAPTER IX

SIXTH AMENDMENT
A fair trial encompasses the individual's right to
confront the witnesses against him, the right to the aid or
presence of counsel, the right to proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the less fundamental right to present one's case
betore an impartial jury for judgment. 1

While many pay

"lip service" to it, Brennan has adhered vigorously to the
view that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty.

In-

deed, his sixth Amendment approach retlects this adherence.
for Brennan, the individual's rights to confront the witnesses against him and to proof beyond a reasonable douot
are unconditional.

The individual's right to the aid of

counsel, on the other hand, is conditional upon whether the
incident in question is a critical stage of the prosecution.

He has joined in expanding the parameters of what

constitutes a critical stage.

i:L'hus, in cases implicating

the Confrontation Clause, or the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt clause, or the right to counsel's assistance at a
critical stage of prosecution, Brennan has employed an ab1

Brennan believes that this right is less fundamental
in comparison with the other three. That he feels this way
goes back to his faith in the judiciary as the protector of
justice.
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solutist approach.
speaking for the Court in ~las v. l\labama (1965),
Brennan contended that the right to cross-examination was a
primary interest secured by the sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.

He argued that this secured right may not

be realized unless an accused is afforded an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.

He

claimed that the

Solicitor's reading of a state witness' statement containing alleged confession to the crimes allegedly perpetrated
by him and DOuglas was "the equivalent in the jury's mind
of testirnony. 112

He thus concluded that the witness, one

Loyd, could not invoke the l:ifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination in order to shield
himself from cross-examination by the accused.

According

to Brennan, the Fifth P.mendment right was surrendered when
the individual voluntarily testified against Douglas.

3

In 1966, the Warren court erected the skeletal framework of the Miranda rule. 4

The following year, through

Brennan, it fleshed out some of this skeleton in the cases
20ouglas v. tiabama, 85 s.ct. 1074 (1965), p. 1077.
3

This does not deviate from Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Brown y. United stat§.§ (see page 104). In that
case, he denied the plaintiff's self-incrimination claim,
but declared conversely that the judge's arbitrary use of
the contempt power violated her right to due process of
law.
4

~a......x..__Arizona, see pages 113-114· Relevant to
the Sixth Amendment, Chief Justice warren declared that its
right to the aid or presence of counsel extended to all
critical stages of prosecution.
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w.Ad§ (1967) and Gilbe,,t._:£.a..._Cali,fornia

of l.ln!ted states v.

(1967) by extending the contours of "critical stage."
issue in

~

At

was whether the courtroom identification of

an accused at trial is to be

excluded f rorn evidence because

the accused was exhibited to the witnesses betore trial at
a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes without notice and in the absence of the accused's
appointed counsel,

Brennan held that wade was entitled to

the aid of counsel during such a proceeding, for it was a
critical stage of prosecution.

He argued that the Sixth

Amendment guaranteed that an accused will not have to
"stand alone against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or not, where counsel's
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial. 115

He contended that a post-indictment lineup for

the purposes of eliciting identification evidence was
"peculiarly riddled with innumberable dangers and variable
factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial."

6

Foremost, he expressed a real concern

with the hazard of mistaken identity.

He wrote, "the vaga-

ries of eyewitness identification are well-known: the annals of criminal law are rife with instances o:t mistaken
identification. 117
5
6

He asserted that counsel was necessary

united statiUl_v. wage, 87 s.ct. 1926 (1967) p. 1932.

~..LI

P• 1933.

7
1bid., p. 1~33.
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in order to safeguard against prejudice.

Indeed, he said

that the adequacy of Wade's defense was contingent upon
it.

"The accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at

trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup," he
wrote, "may deprive him of his only opportunity to meaningfully attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom
identification. 118

'llhus, he concluded that the defendant

must be afforded counsel at such a proceeding in order to
ensure that he will have a fair trial.
In Gilbert, state witnesses identified defendant in
the courtroom, and testif-ied, in substance, to their prior
identification of him in a lineup conducted on a Los Angeles• auditorium stage behind-bright lights which prevented
those in the lineup from seeing the audience, without notice to Gilbert's appointed counsel, sixteen days after his
indictment for armed robbery.

In addition, the defendant

was required to take a handwriting exemplar in absence of
counsel.

Gilbert unsuccessfully moved to have the testi-

mony and the exemplar excluded from court consideration on
the grounds that they were obtained in violation of his
right to counsel.

On review, Brennan denied his motion

concerning the exemplar, but sustained it regarding the
testimony.
8

He argued that the taking of the exemplar was

1b~, p. 1933.
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.

not a critical stage of t h e prosecution.

9

Moreover, he

claimed that if an unrepresentative exemplar were taken it
could be corrected at trial.

He contended that Gibert had

the opportunity for a meaningtul confrontation
of the state's case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the State's
expert handwriting witness and the presentin~ of
the evidence of his own handwriting experts. 0
On the other hand, relying upon

~.

he declared that the

lineup, without notification to appointed counsel, violated
the Sixth Amendment, for it was a critical stage.

Thus, he

concluded that the witnesses' in-court identifications were
tainted, and as such must be excluded.

Indeed, he called

for the adoption of a per se exclusionary rule.

He wrote,

"only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can
be an effective sanction to ensure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's constitutional right
. counse l
presence o f h is

t o th e

. . l l 'ine-up. t ' 11
at t h e critica

The question presented in In re

winshi~

{1~70)

was

whether juveniles, in this case twelve-year old Samuel
winship, are entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
9

In Dionisio {see page 94), he declared, however,
that a grand jury subpoena requiring a suspect's appearance
for the reason ot taking voice or handwriting exemplars
violated the Fourth Amendment.
10

1954.

Gilbe~t v. California, 87 s.ct. 1951 (1967), p.
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when charged with a criminal offence.

12

Brennan, speaking

for the court, declared that they were entitled to the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

He contended

that the standard played "a critical role in the American
scheme of criminal procedure," for it was "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on f actual error. 1113

He wrote:

the standard provides concrete substance tor
the presumption of innocence--the bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.•14
E·inally, he claimed that the use of the standard was critical for cogent reasons.

..A society that values the good

name and freedom ot every individual should not," he wrote,
"condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. 1115

t-1oreover, he wrote, it

was "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law. 1116
At Green's trial, one Melvin Porter, called to testify for the state, claimed that he was unable to recall the
121l'he defendant was found guilty, despite some doubt,
ot juvenile delinquency in New York ramily Court for breaking into a locker and stealing $112 from a women's purse.
Of importance, the court applied New York's delinquency
standard of a preponderance of evidence.
13
14

1n re winshi.Q, 90 s.ct. 1068 {1970), p. 1072.
Ibid., p. 1072.

15 IoiQ.s., p. 1072.
16 Ib'd
1

e

I

p. 1072.
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facts surrounding his purchase of marijuana from said def endant because he was under the influence of LSD at the
time.

Upon the judge's consent, the prosecution introduced

Porter's preliminary hearing testimony in which he identified Green as his supplier.

In

~fornia

v.

~een

(1970),

the supreme Court ruled that the introduction of such evidence did not violate the sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause.

Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, declared that it

did, for it violated his "Sixth Amendment right to grapple
.
l y wit
. h incrimina
.
. . t.ing evi. d ence. 1117
e f f ective

He argued that

there was "no significant diff·erence between a witness who
fails to testify about an alleged offence because he is unwilling to do so and a witness whose silence is compelled
by an inability to remember. 1118

He claimed that the re-

maining question was whether a pretrial statement obtained
at a preliminary hearing under oath and subject to crossexamination met the purposes of the confrontation clause at
trial.

He declared that it did not.

He argued that "cross

examination at the preliminary hearing pales beside that
. h takes pace
l
. l ." 19 Indeed, he wrote, "it igwh ic
at tria
nores reality to assume the purposes of the confrontation
Clause are met during preliminary hearing. 1120

Moreover,

l?~alifox.ni.A v. Green, 90 S.Ct. 1930 (1970), p. 1956.
181.Qig., p.
19

20

1~54.

J;bid., p. 1955.

1hig1, p. 1956.
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he found that the witness' lapse of memory cast serious
doubt upon the reliability of his preliminary hearing testimony.

He concluded that this unreliability, coupled with

the impossibility of its cross-examination at trial, denied
the accused his sixth Amendment rights.
A police station showup for purposes of identif ication, without the presence of counsel, that took place subsequent to Kirby's and a companion's arrest, but before
they had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with
robbing one willie Shard of his traveler's checks and social security card gave birth to Kirby v. Illinois (1972).
The court held that the testimony at trial pertaining to
showup identification was admissible oecause the police
station showup was not a "criminal prosecution" at which
Kirby possessed a constitutional privilege to the aid of
counsel.

In a dissenting opinion, Brennan, citing

~.

contended that the Burger Court law-and-order majority's
opinion deviated from precedent. 21

He argued that since

the police station showup was a critical stage of prosecution, Kirby was entitled to the presence of counsel.
~.

As in

he asserted that the showup, like the lineup, "was

particularly fraught with the peril of mistaken identification. 1122

He wrote:

21

·rhis reflects his respect for precedent. ~. of
course, emanated from his pen, nonetheless, it was precedent.
22

Kirby v. Ill,i112i§, 92 s.ct. 1877 (1972), p. 1887.
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In the setting of a police station squad room
where all present except the petitioner and Bean
(Kirby's companion) were police officers, the danger was quite real that Shard's understandable resentment might lead him too readily to agree with
the police that the pair under arrest, and the
only persons exhibited to him, were indeed the
roobers.23
In Scott v.
that the

~ixth

Illi.D~

(1~79),

the supreme court held

and Fourteenth t-:..mendments only require that

an indigent criminal defendant, in this case one Scott, who
was charged with the offence of .. theft," be afforded the
right to appointed counsel if he is sentenced to a term of
imprisonment.

on a broader scale, this holding reflected

the Burger court law-and-order majority's assault on the
warren court's libertarian view of the indigent's right to
counsel.

For this precise reason, Brennan filed a dissent-

ing opinion.

He proclaimed that the "plain wording of the

sixth Amendment and the court's precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's uncounseled conviction violated the
sixth Amendment. 1124

He argued that the court's opinion re-

stricted "the right to counsel, perhaps the most fundamental sixth Amendment right, more narrowly than the admi'tt e dl y l ess f un d arr.en t a l
24

· ht t o a Jury
·
t ria
· l • 1125
rig

His

scott y. I1linois, 99 S.Ct. 1158 (197~), p. 1163.
These precedents included ~£§jnge.L_v. H~m~jn, 92 S.Ct.
200~ (1~72) in which the Court, through Douglas, held that
'.' abs~nt knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned for any offence, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at trial."
25

IbidL, p. 1170.
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decision turned on the possible sentence, rather than the
actual one.

The fact that the offence of "theft" with

which Scott was charged was punishable by a sentence of up
to one year in jail played a pivotal role in his decision.
l'-1ore importantly, he contended that conviction for theft
carried "the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes
traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravity. 1126

Consequently, he declared that Scott must oe af-

forded the aid of counsel.
Brennan believes that the individual's right to a
jury trial is fundamental, albeit less so than the other
Sixth Amendment guarantees.
number of cases.

His view is reflected in a

He joined in Justice White's majority

opinion in Duncan v. Louisi.an.g (1968).

The case grew out

of the denial of Duncan's request for a jury trial oy the
state Of Louisiana on the ground that its Constitution
granted jury trials only in capital cases or in cases of
imprisonment at hard labor.

Duncan, a black youth, was

charged, convicted, and sentenced to sixty days imprisonment and a $150 fine for the misdemeanor of simple battery
in connection with his slapping of a white youth.

white

declared that trial by jury in criminal cases is f undamental to the American scheme of justice.

Thus, he concluded

that the state of Louisiana was required to afford the accused a jury trial in criminal
26

.

I.oid. , p. 1165.

prosecutions~

and as such
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Duncan's request was justifiable.
In

Jobn§QD~Louisiana

(1972), one

~rank

Johnson was

tried in a Louisiana court by a twelve-person jury and convicted for armed robbery by a 9-3 verdict as authorized by
Louisiana law in cases where the crime is necessarily punishable by hard labor.

'I'he Burger court upheld the verdict

on the ground that state provisions allowing less-thanunanimous jury verdicts in certain criminal cases was constitutional.

In a dissenting opinion, Brennan held, on

the other hand, that such provisions were unconstitutional
on Sixth and J:ourteenth J..mendment grounds.
emotions often run high at criminal trials.

He claimed that
Thus, he called

for an unanimous verdict as a means of counterbalancing
the negative effect of these emotions upon the open-mindedness of jurors and their ability to fairly weigh the arguments opposing their predisposed position.

He wrote:

~hen verdicts must be unanimous, no member of
the jury may be ignored by the others. when less
than unanimity is sufficient, consideration ot
minority views may become nothing more than a matter of majority grace.
In my opinion, the right
of all groups in this Nation to participate in the
criminal process means the right to have their
voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that
right. Najority verdicts could destroy it.27

In Nurphy v. Florida (1975), he dissented from the
court's decision that the petitioner was not denied a fair
27 It .
.
t.ing, b ut not surprising,
. .
is interes
t h at h e sees
the need for unanimous verdicts through the perspective of
free expression and the furtherance of the citizenry's
democratic "self-governing powers."
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trial for the charge of breaking into a house, armed with
intent to rob, because members of the jury had learned
from news accounts about a prior felony conviction for his
involvement in the 1964 theft of the star of India sapphire
from a museum in New York, or certain facts about the crime
with which he was charged.

citing the jurors' testimony

about the effects of these accounts, Brennan claimed "that
the taint of widespread publicity regarding his criminal
background
parent. "28

* * *

infected the jury's deliberations is ap-

He criticized the trial judge for failing to

take the necessary steps both to insulate prospective jurors from media coverage of the prior case and to prevent
pretrial discussion of the present case among them.

He

wrote, "the trial court made no attempt to prevent discussion of the case or petitioner's previous criminal explaits among the prospective jurors, and one juror freely
'
d t h at h e was predisposed
.
.
. .
29
a dm itte
to convict
petitioner."

He thus concluded that the petitioner's right to a tair
trial was violated.
For Brennan, a fair trial encompasses the accused's
rights to counsel, to confront the witnesses against him,
to an impartial jury, and to the use of the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
28

29

MurJ.1b~~orida,
Ibid., p. 2038.

He believes that an ac-

95 s.ct. 2031 (1975), p. 2038.

134
cused is entitled to the aid of counsel at all critical
stages of prosecution.

·rhus, his approach in the area of

this right has turned on his determination ot whether an
occurrence is a critical stage.

In his decisions, he has

declared that a post-indictment line-up, a pre-indictment
police station showup for purposes of identification, and
the trial itself constitute such a stage.

conversely, he

has proclaimed that the taking of a handwriting exemplar
was not a critical stage.

He believes that the accused's

opportunity to cross-examine or confront the witnesses
against him at trial is an essential interest secured by
the sixth Amendment's confrontation Clause.

He has ruled

that the introduction as evidence at trial ot a witness'
~re-trial

statement, when the witness is unwilling or un-

able to take the stand violates the accused's right to confront him.

In short, his approach in sixth Amendment

cases, when the right attaches, is an absolute one.
In the area ot criminal procedure, rlrennan has shown
a deep commitment to the protection of the individual's
lioerties against unwarranted and illegal governmental intrusions.

Over the years, this commitment has necome in-

creasingly absolute.
movement:

Three probable tactors underly this

(1) his continual interest in more enlightened

criminal and trial procedures: (2) the change of guard from
the warren court to the Burger court: and (3) to a lesser
degree, perhaps the oreakdown of ethical consensus.

CHAPTER X

:CIGHTH

A.MEND~iENT

'!'he Eighth lJnendment protects the individual against
the requirement of excessive bail, the imposition of excessive fines, and the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.

Brennan's highth .Amendment decisions primarily have

addressed the issue of cruel and unusual punishments.

He

believes that any punishment that derogates trom human dignity is cruel and unusual.

He has employed "the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society" test to determine whether a particular punishment
is a derogation thereof.

Relying on this standard, he un-

equivocally and without deviation has condemned the use of
the death penalty.

The critical underlying aspects of his

standard, consistent with his liberalism and Christian
faith, is a concern for human dignity, and the fact that
he seems to hold hope for the retormation of even the most
hardened and sadistic of criminals.

In addition, the

breakdown of ethical consensus may have a tenuous intluence
upon him in this area.

Despite the fact that most of the

states have reinstituted its use, many people and groups
still believe strongly that the death penalty is morally
wrong, including the Catholic Church.

The degree of this
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influence is deoatable, but one thing is certain, Brennan
agrees with them.
The issue of the death penalty vis-a-vis the £ighth
Aif.end~ent's

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has been,

and still is, one of the most controversial and problematic
for the Burger court.

Iwiany _t)eople, including the majority

"
.
ot Brennan's Brethen on the Burger court, 1 be l 'ieve tnat
in

certain circumstances the imposition of the death penalty
is justitiaole.

Brennan simply does not agree with this

beliet, and has protested vociferously
matter the circumstances.
ous cases, including
~g.i~

2

its use, no

His view is reflected in numer-

~man

(1976), and Coker y.

In f.Y.r!r~n.

aga~nst

v. Georgi.Q (1972), Gr§SJg_X....
Geo~

(1~77).

the court held that the irn~sition of the

death penalty where statute failed to provide safeguards
against arbitrary and capricious administration was cruel
and unusual.

Brennan filed a concurring opinion because,

unlike the majority, he did not want to leave the door
ajar, even slightly, tor the use of the death penalty.

He

declared that its imposition, regardless of the crime, violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
1

This majority excludes Justice Thurgood ~arshall who
like Brennan, believes that the penalty is absolutely prohibited by the l:.ighth Amendment.
2
The Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the
constitutionality of the penalty under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause.
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Clause.

Examining the history of the clause, he asserted

that the Framers included it to restrict the legislative
branch's power so that it would not have "the unfettered
power to prescribe punishments for crimes."

3

He claimed,

therefore, that the courts must determine the constitutional validity of punishment.

Beyond that, however, he con-

ceded that their intent was imprecise.

He wrote, "we can-

not know exactly what the E'ramers thought 'cruel and unusual punishments' were. 114

He stated that the court "must

draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. 05

Applying

these standards, he asserted that the Clause prohibited
"the infliction of uncivilized and unhumane punishments"
that did not "comport with human dignity. 116

He declared

that ••death was truly an awesome punishment" which by its
nature involved "a denial of the executed person's humanity.117

Moreover, he concluded that the death penalty "in

comparison to all other punishments
grading to human dignity. 08

* * *

is uniquely de-

He proposed a test for deter-

mining whether a punishment violated the Clause.
3

~an

4

v.~xgi_a,

J;bid11 p. 2739.

1~ig.,

p .. 2742.

6 ll2i.s;l.L I

p. 2742.

5

7
8

Ibid..t., p. 2752.
1bid... , P• 2753.

He wrote:

92 s.ct. 2736 (1972), p. 2739.
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The test, then, will ordinarily be a cumulative
one:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected
by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose
more effectively than some less severe punishment,
then the continued infliction of that punishment
violates the command of the Clause.9
Judged against this cumulative test, he concluded that the
death penalty was absolutely inconsistent with the clause.
In Gregg, the Court, concluding that capital punishment may serve the essential function of expressing society's moral outrage, declared that the imposition of the
death penalty was not cruel and unusual where statute provided guidelines for mitigating factors and sentence is not
automatic.

Reaffirming his adherence to an absolute

~ro-

hibition of the death penalty's use, Brennan dissented.

He

attacked the majority's opinion for requiring that "evolving standards of decency focus primarily upon the procedures employed by the State to single out persons to suffer
the penalty of death." 10

Instead, he asserted that these

standards must focus on the essence of the death penalty.
He concluded that
'moral concepts' require us to hold that the law
has progressed to the point where we should declare
that the punishments of death, like punishments on
the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer
morally tolerable in our civilized society.11
9

Ibid., p. 2748.

10

~egg

11

v. Georgia, 96 s.ct. 2909 {1976), p. 2971.

.l.!2ia..t.., P• 2972.
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Ehrlich Anthony Coker, while serving sentences for
murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, escaped
from prison.

For his conduct during the single day of es-

cape, he was convicted of escape, motor vehicle theft,
armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape, the last three which
were capital crimes in Georgia, and sentenced to the death
penalty.

Considering the fact that he had not murdered

anyone during the spree, the court held that the sentence
was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment because it was grossly disproportionate and excessive vis-a-vis the crimes.
Brennan, in a concurring opinion, clung to his view that
the death penalty, regardless of the circumstances, constituted a cruel and unusual punishment.

He thus called

for the setting aside of the imposed sentence.
The death penalty is not substantially rejected by
contemporary society.

The fact that 38 out of 50 states

have restored it bears this out.

Nonetheless, Brennan con-

tinues to persist in his absolute disapproval of its use.
His disapproval is based on his belief that our society has
advanced beyond the "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth" judicial mentality.

Moreover, he believes that it

is unusually severe, and that there is not reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose--retributive and/or
deterrence---more effectively than some less severe punishment, such as life imprisonment.

Remember that his pro-

posed test for determining whether a punishment is cruel
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and unusual is a cumulative one.

That is, in order for a

punishment to pass muster, it must meet all the criteria.
He correctly surmises that the death penalty does not.

In

short, his visceral instinct tells him that it is wrong,
and he finds substantiation for it in history and the language of the Eighth Amendment.
In the past decade, the national media has given wide
coverage to the issue of the United states' overcrowded
prisons.

In fact, this issue was brought to the courts

numerous times in case form for remedy.
was Rhodes y. Chaggian {1981),

One of these cases

The supreme Court held that

prison overcrowding and double-celling such as existed at
the southern Ohio correctional Facility did not constitute
cruel and unusual confinement.

In a concurring opinion,

Brennan claimed that the courts had the responsibility to
scrutinize such claims.

He argued that "the courts have

emerged as a critical force behind efforts to ameloriate
inhumane conditions. 1112

Indeed, he contended that the

courts were peculiarly invested with the ability and opportunity to do so.

He wrote:

Insulated as they are from political pressures,
and charged with the duty of enforcing the constitution, courts are in the strongest position
to insist that unconstitutional conditions be
remedied, even at significant financial cost.13
12 Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1~81), P• 2405.

13

Ibid., p. 2405.
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He claimed that the task involved determining whether the
challenged conditions of confinement comported with human
dignity.

considering the findings of fact, he concluded

that the conditions, examined in their totality, did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, for they did not derQ-gate
from human dignity.
In sum, Brennan's Eighth Amendment decisions have addressed almost exclusively the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.
solutist.
its use.

with respect to capital punishment, he is an abThat is, he has erected an absolute ban against
He believes that it denies the executed individ-

ual his humanity and, as such deviates from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a civilized
society.

Moreover, his faith in the reformation of the

criminal, and respect for human dignity, are implicit in
his capital punishment decisions.

The breakdown of ethical

consensus is also implicit, but to a much lesser degree.
His absolutism, however, does not extend to other cruel and
unusual punishment claims.

In this area, he pays strict

attention to the facts presented in each case.

He does

this in order to determine whether the punishment derogates
from the individual's human dignity.
turns on this determination.

Indeed, his decision

Finally, he believes that it

is the courts' constitutional duty to consider such matters
and, considering the fact that they are relatively immune
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from political pressures, that courts are in the best position to do so. 14

14see Richard Neely, How Courts Govell}...America, (New
Haven.and London: Yale University Press, 1981), for an
interesting and cogent argument along these lines.

CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Justice :Felix Frankfurter once said that he had always taught his law students at Harvard to think for themselves.

He claimed, however, that one of his former

students, Justice william J. Brennan, Jr., went too far.
Questioned as to how he felt about this statement, Brennan
"thought a moment and said he would let the written words
of his opinions tell their own story. 111
In his Bill of Rights opinions, Brennan clearly has
revealed himself as a civil libertarian.

He believes that

the Bill of Rights was intended by its Framers to prevent
government oppression of individual rights.

He consequent-

ly has shown a strong predilection for the protection of
individual liberty against governmental intrusions.

In-

deed, over the years, this predilection in many circumstances has become increasingly absolute.
Two key notions are evidenced in his libertarianism:
respect for

perso~al

privacy and human dignity: and demo-

cratic self-government.

He views privacy as an intrinsic

human privilege that the government can not abridge, unless
1

Joseph E'oote, "Mr. Justice Brennan: A Profile,"
liaJ;xgrd Law School~ulletin, 18 (November, 1966), p. 20.
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the societal need is compelling.

Moreover, in many cases,

he seemingly has ignored the government's proposed reason(s).

While the notion of privacy is mirrored in all of

his Bill of Rights decisions, the notion of democratic
self-government is reflected primarily in his F·irst Amendment opinions.

He considers freedom of expression the most

precious of the first ten amendments• guarantees, for it
leads to the increased knowledge and sophistication of the
electorate.

In the event that the two notions come into

conflict, as in :ri,me. Inc. y. Hill, 2 he has resolved in
favor of democratic self-government.
The concept of "ordered liberty," likewise, is critical to his libertarianism.

In fact, it was primarily the

determining factor for him in Schmer~Y.L Californi~.

3

He wrote that individual liberty is the basis of American
democracy.
limits.

But, as he further wrote, this liberty has its

In short, "it is a liberty of the individual under

such restraints as are necessary to preserve the same

. h ts of others." 4
rig

For Brennan, the unrestrained exercise

of individual liberty leads to chaos or anarchy.
words, it destroys liberty.
perative.

Thus, a degree of order is im-

He was undoubtedly correct when he said,

~, at pp. 76-78.

2

3
4

In other

.Mli1 at PP• 90-93, 110-111.
Brennan, "Ordered Liberty," p. 14.

11

with-
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out 'order' there is no 'liberty.

1

"

5

Nonetheless, he real-

izes also that too much order suffocates liberty.

There-

fore, he calls for just enough order to attain the allimportant desire for individual liberty.

In the vast ma-

jority of cases, he has declared that the degree of governmentally imposed order was indeed too much.
During his twenty-six years on the court, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., has played a leading role in
strengthening and expanding the liberties of the individual.

As Edward

v.

Heck asserted, he was the cutting edge

of warren Court liberalism. 6

Moreover, he has continued

in this role, indeed in more pronounced fashion, as a member of the Burger Court.

5
6

Ibid,, p. 15.
Id., at p. 2.
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